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INTRODUCTION
America's Chief Executive creates a conundrum for legal scho-
lars. Presidents today sit at the center of the political universe. They
have become responsible for national security and economic growth,
they are the chiefs of their political parties, and their proposals set the
legislative agenda for Congress. With the military power of the United
States behind them, presidents were known during the Cold War as
the leaders of the free world. Our 24-hour news cycle hangs on their
every word and speculates on their family lives, their medical condi-
tions, their psychology, and even their favorite breeds of dog.
The transition from the Bush to the Obama administration has
only highlighted the importance of the person who occupies the office.
Both men hold individual, and different, policies for responding to the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. President George W. Bush
invoked his constitutional powers, though often supported by congres-
sional approval, to launch wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, detain al
Qaeda and Taliban members as enemy combatants subject to military
trials, and use aggressive interrogation and electronic surveillance
measures against terrorists. President Barack Obama has invoked his
constitutional authority to order the detention facility at the US Naval
Base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba closed, suspend military commission
trials, and limit the interrogation of terrorists. Differences in policies
also occur in areas as diverse as global warming, antiballistic missile
defenses, national health care, and judicial appointments. The prefe-
rences of the person who occupies the Oval Office significantly influ-
ence policies in almost every area under the sun.
For legal scholars, the problem created by this state of affairs is
that the central importance of the modern Presidency seems to con-
tradict the Constitution's text. The Constitution undeniably enume-
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rates more powers for Congress than the president. Congress has the
authority to tax, spend, and regulate interstate commerce, which pro-
vides it with the power to enact domestic legislation. In contrast, Ar-
ticle II of the Constitution seems to vest the president with a paltry
sum of powers. Scholars, such as Arthur Schlesinger, Jr, coined the
classic phrase the "imperial presidency" to describe the idea that over
time the executive branch has assumed powers that the Constitution
directs to others.' According to this view, the Presidency has few inhe-
rent constitutional powers, but rather exists to carry out the laws
passed by Congress. Even in foreign affairs and national security, the
legislature should play the leading role in defining national policy. The
Presidency's growth into the dominant political institution it is today
may be the product of changes in the national political system or ex-
ternal pressures, but that makes it no more legitimate.
Steven G. Calabresi and Christopher S. Yoo (no relation, as far as
I know) have joined the many scholars who have tried to solve this
problem (p 4). Their approach is unique, at least for law professors,
and it is one that they had previously sketched out in a series of law
review articles.2 They do not focus on what political scientists have
criticized as the "literary theory" of the Constitution, which seeks to
understand the office through a pure understanding of its powers as
set out in the text.' Nor do they approach the question by carefully
parsing the few relevant Supreme Court precedents, such as Morrison
1 Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr, The Imperial Presidency ix (Houghton Mifflin 1973) (arguing
that the constitutional checks on the president's power have been eroded, largely as a result of
the president's "capture ... of the most vital of national decisions, the decision to go to war").
2 See generally Steven G. Calabresi and Christopher S. Yoo, The Unitary Executive during
the First Half-century, 47 Case W Res L Rev 1451 (1997) (exploring the history of the unitary
executive from the founding through President Andrew Jackson); Steven G. Calabresi and Chris-
topher S. Yoo, The Unitary Executive during the Second Half-century, 26 Harv J L & Pub Pol 667
(2003) (continuing the history of the unitary executive from President Martin Van Buren to
President Grover Cleveland); Steven G. Calabresi, Christopher S. Yoo, and Laurence D. Nee, The
Unitary Executive during the Third Half-century, 1889-1945, 80 Notre Dame L Rev 1 (2004)
(continuing the history of the unitary executive from President William Henry Harrison to Pres-
ident Franklin Roosevelt); Steven G. Calabresi, Christopher S. Yoo, and Anthony J. Colangelo,
The Unitary Executive in the Modem Era, 1945-2004, 91 Iowa L Rev 601 (2005) (concluding the
history of the unitary executive from President Harry Truman to President George W. Bush).
3 See Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power and the Modem Presidents 37 (Free Press 1990)
("The probabilities of power do not derive from the literary theory of the Constitution.") (emphasis
omitted). But see Richard M. Pious, The American Presidency 17 (Basic Books 1979) ("[T]he funda-
mental and irreducible core of presidential power rests not on influence, persuasion, public opinion,
elections, or party, but rather on the successful assertion of constitutional authority to resolve crises
and significant domestic issues"); Terry Eastland, Energy in the Executive 9 (Free Press 1992) ("The
presidency ... cannot be understood apart from what the Constitution says it is").
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v Olson' or Humphrey's Executor v United States,' for a new nugget of
insight that has escaped everyone else. Rather, they have conducted
an exhaustive survey of the views of each administration in American
history. They attempt to show that every president has resisted con-
gressional efforts to disrupt the unitary executive. Why? To convince
the "Burkean common law constitutionalists" that presidents have not
"acquiesced in a derogation of their power in a sufficiently systematic,
unbroken, and unquestioned manner to make such a derogation a part
of the structure of our government" (p 15). A consistent presidential
defense of the executive power will defeat claims that historical prac-
tice justifies the constitutional legitimacy of independent administra-
tive agencies or the independent counsel statute (pp 14-16).
Calabresi and Yoo, however, define the unitary executive in a
much narrower way than the current controversy over presidential
power would demand. They define the unitary executive as founded
on the president's constitutional authority to command or remove all
subordinate officials (p 14). As to whether the president possesses any
other inherent or implied powers, the authors proclaim themselves to
be "agnostic" (p 20). Focusing on the procedure, rather than the sub-
stance, of executive power may make sense as a matter of lawyerly
argument. All Calabresi and Yoo wish to prove is the president's pri-
macy in the management of the executive branch, regardless of the
position's actual powers (pp 20-21).
But it is unclear as a matter of theory that we can separate the
independence of the executive branch from its substance. While the
Framers wanted to restore unity and independence to the executive
branch, they also remained focused on the actual powers to be given
to the president.6 In The Federalist Papers, Alexander Hamilton ob-
served that the president had to be directly elected, for example, ra-
ther than chosen by the legislature, and should be one man, rather
than multiple leaders, to ensure the executive could act with decision
4 487 US 654 (1988).
5 295 US 602 (1935).
6 See, for example, Federalist 74-76 (Hamilton), in The Federalist 500, 500-15 (Wesleyan
1961) (Jacob E. Cooke, ed) (describing the president's substantive powers to direct war, grant par-
dons, make treaties (with the Senate), and nominate and appoint officials (with the Senate)).
7 See Federalist 68 (Hamilton), in The Federalist 457,459 (cited in note 6) (explaining that
the Convention has "not made the appointment of the president to depend on any pre-existing
bodies of men who might be tampered with before hand to prostitute their votes; but they have
referred it in the first instance to an immediate act of the people of America").
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and vigor.8 But Hamilton also wrote there that the president would
possess well-understood powers, even in-or especially in-the area
of foreign affairs and national security.9 "Of all the cares or concerns
of government," Hamilton wrote in Federalist 74, "the direction of
war most peculiarly demands those qualities which distinguish the
exercise of power by a single hand."'0 The very theory of constitutional
interpretation that established the idea of the unitary executive-that
Article II, § l's Vesting Clause grants all of the federal executive pow-
er to the president alone, subject only to narrow, explicit exceptions in
the text itself-did not arise in the context of the removal power. Un-
der the pseudonym of Pacificus, Hamilton advanced the theory in de-
fense of President George Washington's declaration of neutrality in
the wars of the French Revolution." The authority to proclaim neu-
trality did not depend on the president's power of removal, but on an
implicit executive authority to set and conduct foreign policy on be-
half of the nation.
Part I of this Review places The Unitary Executive in its legal
context. The argument over the removal power became important as a
constitutional proxy for the struggle between the president and Con-
gress for control of the administrative state. Calabresi and Yoo make
the modest argument that presidents never foreswore the removal
power. Initially, defenders of presidential control over the administra-
tive state based their legal arguments on a formalist reading of Ar-
ticle II and the constitutional structure. Critics, however, responded
that the record of practice justified the independence of administra-
tive agencies.
The Unitary Executive seeks to undermine these historical claims
by showing a consistent presidential practice of opposing congression-
al encroachments on the executive branch. Part II discusses in more
detail the evidence brought forward by Calabresi and Yoo, and
whether it supports their interpretive claims about practice. The au-
8 See Federalist 69-70 (Hamilton), in The Federalist 462,472 (cited in note 6) (noting that
"the executive authority, with few exceptions, is to be vested in a single magistrate" so he can act
with the necessary "[d]ecision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch").
9 See Federalist 74 (Hamilton) at 500 (cited in note 6) (noting, for example, that the com-
mander-in-chief power to direct war "forms an usual and essential part in the definition of the
executive authority").
10 Id.
11 See Alexander Hamilton, Pacificus No 1 (June 29, 1793), in Harold C. Syrett, ed, 15 The
Papers of Alexander Hamilton 33, 39 (Columbia 1969) (arguing that the different language the
Constitution uses to describe the grants of legislative and executive powers, respectively, sup-
ports the inference that executive power was meant to be understood as a general grant, "subject
only to the exceptions and qu[a]lifications which are expressed in the instrument").
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thors deserve praise for shedding light on a historical practice that has
escaped the attention of legal scholars in general, and specialists on
the separation of powers in particular. Their effort at comprehensive-
ness-there is a chapter on each presidential administration-
precludes a deeper focus on critical moments, despite an effort to in-
clude case studies on events such as President Andrew Jackson's cam-
paign against the Second Bank of the United States (pp 105-22). The
authors could have done more to explain whether presidents have
undermined their claims to consistency when they have signed bills
creating independence within the executive branch-for example,
FDR's acceptance of New Deal agencies (pp 291-99) or Jimmy Cart-
er's approval of the Ethics in Government Act (pp 365-66).2
Part III then turns to the fundamental question of whether
process-the removal power-can be segregated from the issue of the
president's substantive constitutional powers. It points out that the
arguments made for the unitary executive, in Calabresi and Yoo's
sense of the phrase, depend on the same theory of constitutional con-
struction used to justify the president's inherent powers in foreign
affairs and national security. Furthermore, Part III argues that our
greatest presidents have depended on these substantive powers, not
just their management of the executive branch, to rise to the challenge
of the great crises and emergencies that have faced the nation. Part III
argues that Presidents Washington, Jefferson, and Lincoln could not
have achieved their greatest successes without a broad understanding
of "the executive power," as set out in Article II of the Constitution.
I. WHY REMOVAL MATTERS
Current legal scholarship on the Presidency remains focused on
the removal debate.1" Simply put, the question is whether the president
12 See Ethics in Government Act, Pub L No 95-521,92 Stat 1824 (1978), codified at 2 USC
§ 701 et seq (showing that the Ethics in Government Act requires, among other things, that
members of the executive branch file an annual public financial disclosure).
13 See, for example, Steven G. Calabresi and Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's
Power to Execute the Laws, 104 Yale L J 541, 597 (1994) ("[T]he President must also have a
removal power so that he will be able to maintain control over the personnel of the executive
branch."); Lawrence Lessig and Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94
Colum L Rev 1, 26 & n 119, 27-28 (1994) (finding no consensus among Framers that the
president had complete authority to remove inferior officers). See also Morrison, 487 US at
685-93 (1988) (holding that the "good cause" removal provision for independent counsel
does not impermissibly burden the president's power to control executive officials);
Bowsher v Synar, 478 US 714, 726 (1986) ("[W]e conclude that Congress cannot reserve for
itself the power of removal of an officer charged with the execution of the laws except by
impeachment.").
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has the inherent constitutional authority to fire any individual respon-
sible for executing federal law. A corollary question is whether Con-
gress can vest law enforcement functions in agencies outside the ex-
ecutive branch.
The significance of this issue goes beyond making the president
head of human resources for the federal government. Since the end of
World War II, presidents have consistently sought to establish tighter
control over the executive branch." This was a natural response to
three fundamental changes in American government. First, the Su-
preme Court's lifting of the limits on federal power vis-A-vis the states
allowed economic regulation on a truly national scale. 5 During the
twenty years after the New Deal, Congress-often at the behest of
presidents -enacted laws setting national standards for working con-
ditions, labor unions, and wages and hours, among other subjects.16
Another burst of federal regulation followed in the 1960s and 1970s;
federal rules spread to cover crime, voting, housing, race, consumer
rights,.and the environment." The New Deal taught Americans to ex-
14 John P. Burke, The Institutional Presidency 181-85 (Johns Hopkins 1992) (concluding
that, with the possible exception of President Eisenhower, there has been a distinct trend across
all presidents to centralize decisionmaking power).
15 See, for example, West Coast Hotel Co v Parrish, 300 US 379, 395 (1937) (upholding a
state minimum wage law for women and children); NLRB v Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp, 301
US 1, 30 (1937) (upholding the National Labor Relations Act).
16 See, for example, Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, Pub L No 80-101, 61 Stat
136, codified at 29 USC §§ 151-56 (strengthening employer protections against unionization);
Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1949, Pub L No 81-393, 63 Stat 910, codified in various
sections of Title 29 (modifying minimum wage and maximum hours regulations); Minimum Wage
Increase of 1955, Pub L No 84-381, 69 Stat 711 (increasing the minimum wage); Labor-
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, Pub L No 86-257, 73 Stat 519, codified in
various sections of Title 29 (regulating union corruption).
17 See, for example, Housing Act of 1961, Pub L No 87-70, 75 Stat 149, codified in various
sections of Title 12 (promoting urban development to increase housing availability); Clean Air
Act of 1963, Pub L No 88-206, 77 Stat 392, codified at 42 USC § 1857; Civil Rights Act of 1964,
Pub L No 88-352,78 Stat 241, codified in various sections of Title 42; Elementary and Secondary
Education Act of 1965, Pub L No 89-10, 79 Stat 27, codified in various sections of Title 20 (in-
creasing funds to elementary and secondary education); Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub L No 89-
110, 79 Stat 437, codified at 42 USC § 1973 (providing federal protections to secure equal voting
rights); Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965, Pub L No 89-117, 79 Stat 451 (promoting
urban development to assist low- and moderate-income families); Higher Education Act of 1965,
Pub L No 89-329, 79 Stat 1219, codified in various sections of Title 20 (increasing resources avail-
able to higher education institutions); Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub L No 90-284, 82 Stat 73,
codified in various sections of Title 18 (strengthening federal civil rights protections, particularly
in housing); Consumer Credit Protection Act, Pub L No 90-321, 82 Stat 146 (1968), codified at 15
USC § 1601 et seq (increasing protections to credit consumers); Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act, Pub L No 90-351, 82 Stat 197 (1968) (increasing federal involvement in criminal
law); Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, Pub L No 90-448, 82 Stat 476, codified in
various sections of Title 12 (providing more assistance to low- and moderate-income families
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pect their national government to do more to cure everyday problems,
and presidents and Congresses together responded with a mixture of
direct rules, criminal laws, tax benefits, and spending.
Second, Congress delegated sweeping powers over these new
subjects of federal attention to the executive branch and independent
agencies.'8 Delegation gave presidents more power, but at a political
price. Delegation allows Congress to escape political responsibility for
difficult public policy choices, usually ones that will spark political
opposition no matter what option is chosen."9 Congress can avoid mak-
ing decisions that are risky or unpredictable, or that require scientific
or technical judgment." Better to have the executive branch, for ex-
ample, balance safety, air quality, industrial growth, and fuel costs in
setting minimum mileage requirements for automobiles.2' Individual
legislators can criticize almost any agency decision without having to
face the difficult political tradeoffs themselves.12 They can focus in-
stead on funneling benefits to discrete groups that will support them
with votes or campaign contributions.23 Delegation shifts political re-
sponsibility for a multitude of regulatory decisions to the president
from Congress."
Third, FDR set the example of presidents, not Congress, as the
energetic force responsible for solving the nation's domestic problems.
seeking housing); Consumer Product Safety Act of 1972, Pub L No 92-573, 86 Stat 1207, codified
at 15 USC § 2051 et seq (establishing the Consumer Product Safety Commission); Housing and
Community Development Act of 1974, Pub L No 93-383, 88 Stat 633, codified at 42 USC § 5301
et seq (promoting urban development to renew American cities); Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub
L No 95-217, 91 Stat 1566, codified in various sections of Title 33 (strengthening federal envi-
ronmental protections of American waterways).
18 David Epstein and Sharyn O'Halloran, Delegating Powers: A Transaction Cost Politics
Approach to Policy Making under Separate Powers 5 (Cambridge 1999) ("What divides the
modem administrative state from its predecessors is the delegation of broad decision-making
authority to a professional civil service.").
19 See, for example, id at 1-4 (referring to the closing of military bases).
20 See id at 198 (noting that Congress delegates the most authority in foreign relations,
space and technology, consumer and product safety, the environment, and public health).
21 42 USC § 7521; Epstein and O'Halloran, Delegating Powers at 5 (cited in note 18)
("[Tlhe 1970 Clean Air Act required that industries use the 'best available control technology' to
reduce emissions but left the definition of the crucial term 'best' to the EPA's discretion.").
22 See Epstein and O'Halloran, Delegating Powers at 23 (cited in note 18) (noting that
Congress can shift blame to the executive branch for difficult decisions).
23 Id at 230 (noting that legislators "guard their authority in taxing and spending areas" in
part to retain control over distributive, pork barrel programs).
24 See William Howell, Power without Persuasion: The Politics of Direct Presidential Action
109 (2003) (inferring that Congress delegates more power to the president in areas of policy
where electoral rewards are small); Epstein and O'Halloran, Delegating Powers at 23 (cited in
note 18) (explaining that Congress is likely to do this in "policy areas where, even if great care is
taken, things will go wrong every so often").
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Presidents are now held accountable for the nation's economic per-
formance, over which they have little real power (in contrast to the
Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board)." They are expected to sub-
mit annual budgets to Congress, even though it is the legislature that
16
commands the power of the purse. They launch comprehensive
reform proposals to deal with every imaginable national problem,
even though the Constitution gives Congress almost all of the national
government's powers over domestic affairs. Presidents today are ex-
pected to have solutions at hand for problems big and small: natural
disasters (Hurricane Katrina relief), local crime (midnight basketball
for teens), and poor borrowing decisions (lowering mortgage rates).'
As Richard Neustadt wrote almost five decades ago, "Everybody now
expects the man inside the White House to do something about every-
thing.'' " Presidential proposals for legislation, managed by White
House lobbyists and backed up by the veto pen, are now a central fea-
ture of president-Congress relations.
While all three of these developments had their historical antece-
dents, they emerged during the New Deal on a massive scale. Postwar
25 Terry M. Moe and Scott A. Wilson, Presidents and the Politics of Structure, 57 L & Con-
temp Probs 1, 11 (1994) ("When the economy declines, an agency falters, or a social problem
goes unaddressed, it is the president who gets the blame, and whose popularity and historical
legacy are on the line."). See also Theodore J. Lowi, The Personal President: Power Invested,
Promise Unfulfilled 19 (Cornell 1985) (arguing that, although President Reagan was able to
maintain high approval ratings because of "the succession of international events ... eventually,
he will be paid because he is the piper").
26 US Const Art I, § 8, cl 1.
27 See President Outlines Hurricane Katrina Relief Efforts (Aug 31, 2005), online at
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2005/08/20050831-3.html (visited Oct
2, 2009); Radio Address by the President to the Nation (June 18, 1994), online at
http:I/clinton6.nara.gov/1994/06/1994-06-18-radio-address-on-the-crime-bill.html (visited Sept 19,
2009); Remarks by the President on the Home Mortgage Crisis (Feb 18, 2009), at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/Remarks-by-the-President-on-the-mortgage-crisis
(visited Oct 2,2009).
28 Richard Neustadt, Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership 6 (Wiley 1960). See also
Theodore Lowi, The Personal President at x-xi (cited in note 25) (labeling the latter part of the
twentieth century the era of "presidential government," in which presidents enjoyed "credit
beyond desert for putting the world to rights" and accepted disproportionate blame when things
went wrong); Stephen Skowronek, The Politics Presidents Make: Presidential Leadership from
John Adams to George Bush 17-32 (Belknap 1993) (arguing that presidential legacy depends less
on concrete policy victories than it does on maintaining control over a broader social narrative);
Thomas E. Cronin and Michael A. Genovese, The Paradoxes of the American Presidency 323
(Oxford 2003) ("It seems we want the presidency to be there always, ready when we call, to rise
when the demand grows and diminish in less pressing times. We want a presidency with the
potential to be heroic when we need it, but constrained and limited at other times."). For a dis-
cussion of how the president accomplishes his legislative program, see generally Andrew Ruda-
levige, Managing the President's Program: Presidential Leadership and Legislative Policy Forma-
tion (Princeton 2002).
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presidents responded by seeking to impose order and rationality over
the executive branch." Originally, delegation was driven by the idea
that the executive branch would bring greater technical expertise.
Rules would come from neutral administrators, rather than the politi-
cal process and its susceptibility to temporary passions or interest-
group biases. During the later New Deal and postwar period, however,
it became evident that politics were inseparable from administration,
especially as the delegations became broader. The Clean Air Act,' for
example, orders the Environmental Protection Agency to set air-
quality standards the attainment of which "are requisite to protect the
public health.,,3' Deciding how much aerial pollutant to allow goes
beyond technical expertise and requires tradeoffs between competing
values, such as economic growth and improved health. As an original
matter, it is doubtful that the Framers believed the legislature could
grant such sweeping power absent the necessities of wartime emer-
gency. But after losing the New Deal confrontations, the courts no
longer policed the amount of delegation from Congress to the execu-
32tive branch.
If the president were to be held responsible for everything from
air quality to voting rights, he would want to have the power to actual-
ly set the standards. Perhaps the most important function that centra-
29 Peri E. Arnold, Making the Managerial Presidency: Comprehensive Reorganization
Planning, 1905-1996 160 (Kansas 2d ed 1998) (arguing that by the 1952 presidential election,
"[tihe notion that the president was responsible for management in the executive branch was
widely shared"); Burke, Institutional Presidency at 2 (cited in note 14).
30 42 USC § 7401 et seq.
31 42 USC § 7409(b)(1).
32 The trend toward broad delegation is criticized on political grounds by Theodore Lowi,
The End of Liberalism: The Second Republic of the United States 93-94 (Norton 2d ed 1979)
(claiming that delegation "becomes pathological ... at the point where it comes to be considered
a good thing in itself, flowing to administrators without guides, checks, safeguards"); Martin H.
Redish, The Constitution as Political Structure 135-61 (Oxford 1995) (arguing that the abandon-
ment of the nondelegation doctrine has caused serious damage to the infrastructure of "Ameri-
can political theory"); David Schoenbrod, Power without Responsibility: How Congress Abuses
the People through Delegation 99-152 (Yale 1993) (arguing that delegation weakens democracy,
threatens liberty, makes law less reasonable, and is unnecessary because Congress has enough
time to make the laws itself), and on constitutional law grounds by Larry Alexander and Sai-
krishna Prakash, Reports of the Nondelegation Doctrine's Death are Greatly Exaggerated, 70 U
Chi L Rev 1297, 1328 (2003) (arguing that Article I's Vesting Clause "refers to the powers listed
in Article I, Section 8 and not the de jure powers of legislators"); Gary Lawson, Delegation and
Original Meaning, 88 Va L Rev 327,335-52 (2002) (grounding the nondelegation principle in the
original meaning of the Constitution). For a defense of the trend, see Eric A. Posner and Adrian
Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U Chi L Rev 1721, 1723 (2002) (arguing that
Article I's Vesting Clause only prohibits legislators from delegating their votes in the legislature
to unelected individuals).
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lization could play is to make sure that rules set in one area are consis-
tent with the administration's overall domestic priorities and are co-
herent with national policy. All of the Cold War presidents sought to
increase their ability to administer the vast swaths of bureaucracy in-
side the Beltway-both to inject more expertise into decisions and to
make themselves the voice of electoral accountability within the ad-
ministrative state. But they also wanted to make sure that the thou-
sands of decisions made by the agencies every day were moving in the
same direction. If the president has just been elected in the midst of a
recession, for example, his White House could press each major agen-
cy decision to strike its regulatory balance toward pro-growth policies
and private-market ordering. Given the breadth of federal power and
the amount of delegation to the administrative state, centralization
gives the president the upper hand in making the decisions that ac-
tually impact private citizens in their daily lives.
The primary method became direct presidential control over
agencies' decisions through a larger and more specialized White
House staff. A critical effort took place between the Nixon and Rea-
gan administrations through the imposition of cost-benefit analysis on
the executive branch by the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB). Under Director George Shultz, OMB began to review envi-
ronmental regulations to determine whether their economic benefits
outweighed their costs.33 The campaign to centralize control over the
administrative state had a constitutional front too, through the effort
to increase the formal control of the president over the executive
branch and independent agencies.' Allowing the president to remove
any officer responsible for carrying out federal law would give him di-
rect control over the activities of the administrative state. If a subordi-
nate refused to obey a presidential command -for example, to find that
33 The classic explanation of OMB cost-benefit review remains Christopher C. DeMuth
and Douglas H. Ginsburg, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking, 99 Harv L Rev 1075,
1080-88 (1986) (explaining and defending the agency-review programs put in place by President
Reagan). For a more recent investigation, see generally Steven Croley, White House Review of
Agency Rulemaking:An Empirical Investigation, 70 U Chi L Rev 821 (2003) (providing an overview
of executive oversight of agency decisions from the Reagan through the Clinton administrations). A
description of the Reagan administration's overall approach to the constitutional issues can be
found in Eastland, Energy in the Executive at 163-64 (cited in note 3) (arguing that Reagan's regu-
latory review program embodied the belief that "[ulnder the Constitution, the President is respon-
sible for this body of administrative law and its consequences for the nation").
34 See David E. Lewis, Presidents and the Politics of Agency Design: Political Insulation in
the United States Government Bureaucracy, 1946-1997 86-87 (Stanford 2003) (noting that presi-
dents can exercise influence over agencies using formal powers like the veto power, his role as
chief executive, and his role as unitary head of state).
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carbon dioxide is not a pollutant under the Clean Air Act-the presi-
dent could replace him with someone who would carry out his policies.
Congress, however, placed numerous obstacles to presidential
coordination and control of regulatory policy. While Congress wants
to shift political responsibility to the president by delegation, it still
seeks to retain as much influence over the agency as possible.35 In
Congress's ideal world, the president would take all of the downside
for politically unpopular decisions, while Congress could continue to
dictate to agencies the rules that it wanted to satisfy different interest
groups.' A chief tool to achieve this end was to insulate agencies from
presidential control.37 Congress cannot prevent the president from
appointing the heads of the agencies, and all of the postwar presidents
generally attempted to choose nominees who agreed with their poli-
cies.3 But Congress could make it difficult for the president to fire
them once in office by permitting only for-cause removal. Without the
threat of removal, presidents would have little formal authority to
compel independent agencies to obey their orders." Agency leaders
would become more susceptible to control by Congress, which would
continue to control their funding and legislative mandate, and poten-
tially embarrass them (or praise them) in oversight hearings.0
35 Epstein and O'Halloran, Delegating Powers at 22 (cited in note 18) ("Congress delegates
broad power to bureaucrats knowing in advance that they will make mistakes. When they do so,
legislators can step in, undo any wrongs imposed on their constituents, and reap all the credit for
making things right.").
36 Id at 29-30.
37 A second tool- influencing the content of regulations through informal methods-was
best expressed with the legislative veto, which was challenged in court by the Reagan administra-
tion and eventually struck down in INS v Chadha, 462 US 919, 959 (1983).
38 Lewis, Presidents and the Politics of Agency Design at 24 (cited in note 34) (noting that
the Founding Fathers "granted presidents the ability to nominate principal officers").
39 Calabresi and Prakash, 104 Yale L J at 598 (cited in note 13) ("If the President is to have
effective control of his constitutionally granted powers, he must be able to remove those who he
believes will not follow his administrative agenda and philosophy."); Lewis, Presidents and the
Politics of Agency Design at 26 (cited in note 34) (arguing that presidential control over agency
design is critical towards preserving a "manageable" bureaucracy).
40 Lewis, Presidents and the Politics of Agency Design at 143-44 (cited in note 34) (noting
that where the president's removal power is absent, Congress gets more of its desired policy
outcomes); Edward Markey, Congress to Administrative Agencies: Creator, Overseer, and Partner,
1990 Duke L J 967, 971 (outlining tactics Congress can use in response to "agency intransi-
gence"); Barry Weingast and Mark Moran, Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control?
Regulatory Policymaking at the Federal Trade Commission, 91 J Polit Econ 765, 769-70 (1983)
(noting how Congress can exert influence over agencies by favoring top performers, holding
oversight hearings, and wisely using confirmation hearings); Peter Strauss, The Place of Agencies
in the Government. Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 Colum L Rev 573,592 (1984)
("Perhaps the central fact of legislative-executive management of oversight relationships with
the agencies is the extent to which behavior is determined by political factors rather than law.").
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The Reagan administration launched a steady campaign against
congressional efforts to shield the agencies from presidential control.
It defeated direct legislative control over executive branch officers in
Bowsher v Synar," which prohibited an officer subject to congression-
al removal from executing a deficit reduction act. 2 In INS v Chadha,"'
Reagan successfully attacked an informal tool for influencing regula-
tions, the legislative veto, which allowed one house of Congress to
vote to block administrative action.i In 1987, the administration at-
tempted to assert removal authority over the agencies, the final step in
its campaign, by attacking the independent counsel established by the
Ethics in Government Act of 1978."
The basic constitutional argument in favor of presidential control
relies on two provisions of the Constitution and a broader point about
constitutional structure. First, Article II of the Constitution vests "the
executive power" in the president of the United States. 6 Unlike Ar-
ticle I, which enumerates the "legislative powers herein granted" to
Congress,7 Article II does not define the "executive power." It could
be limited to the few powers set out in Article II, § 2, such as the
commander-in-chief power, the opinion power, and the right to issue
pardons, fill vacancies, call Congress into session, and receive ambas-
sadors."3 The president shares the great powers set out in Article II,
such as making treaties and appointing officers, with the Senate. 9 Still,
the power to remove could fairly be said to reside within the presi-
41 478 US 714 (1986).
42 Id at 736 (holding that the powers vested in the Comptroller General under § 251 of the
Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act exceeded those authorized by the Constitution).
43 462 US 919 (1983).
44 Id at 919.
45 Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub L No 95-521, 92 Stat 1824, 1867, codified at 28
USC §§ 591-98. The independent counsel provision was reauthorized in 1983, 1987, and 1994.
See Ethics in Government Act Amendments of 1982, Pub L No 97-409, 96 Stat 2039 (1983),
codified in various sections of Title 28; Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act of 1987, Pub L
No 100-191, 101 Stat 1293, codified at 28 USC §§ 591-99; Independent Counsel Reauthorization
Act of 1994, Pub L No 103-270, 108 Stat 732, codified in various sections of Title 28. The inde-
pendent counsel provision was allowed to sunset in 1999. See William K. Kelley, The Constitu-
tional Dilemma of Litigation under the Independent Counsel System, 83 Minn L Rev 1197, 1234-
41 (1999) (discussing constitutional issues raised by independent counsels); Ken Gormley, An
Original Model of the Independent Counsel Statute, 97 Mich L Rev 601, 608-38 (1999) (describ-
ing history).
46 US Const Art II, § 1, cl 1.
47 Compare US Const Art I, § 1 with US Const Art II, § 1, cl 1.
48 US Const Art II, § 2, cl 2.
49 Id (giving the president the power to make appointments with the Senate's "advice and
consent" and the power to make treaties with the "advice and consent of the Senate," provided
"two thirds of the Senators present concur").
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dent's unenumerated executive power. Executives in the colonies and
Great Britain held the power to appoint officers alone, and hence the
power to remove (p 309). Because the Constitution specifically condi-
tions the appointment power upon the Senate's advice and consent,
but remains silent on removal, we can infer that removal remains an
executive power. '
Second, the Constitution makes the president the nation's chief
law enforcement officer. It grants perhaps the most significant execu-
tive power, that of taking "Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,"
in the president alone." The Take Care Clause makes the president
responsible for enforcing federal law, which implies an ancillary au-
thority to interpret it in the course of enforcement. This is especially
the case with federal laws that have not reached the stage of judicial
interpretation, but even arises in setting law enforcement priorities for
scarce executive resources. Because the Constitution makes the presi-
dent ultimately responsible for executing the laws, he must also have
the ability to control inferior executive officers to prevent them from
enforcing or interpreting federal law at odds with his views. This view
implies that any federal officer responsible for enforcing federal law
must be a member of the executive branch. Otherwise, Congress could
vest an agency with the authority to enforce federal law, but locate it
outside the executive branch and thereby permit the execution of fed-
eral law beyond the president's control (p 293).52
A third argument generally flows from claims about the Constitu-
tion's structure, one first made by Alexander Hamilton in the Helvi-
dius-Pacificus debates. The Constitution vests the president with "the
executive power."53 As Justice Antonin Scalia wrote in his dissent in
Morrison, this "does not mean some of the executive power, but all of
the executive power." Article II constitutes a broad grant of power,
much like Article III's Vesting Clause, which is the only textual source
for the federal judiciary's powers." The powers enumerated in § 2,
50 See notes 34, 39, and accompanying text.
51 US Const Art II, § 3.
52 For a prominent argument along these lines, see Saikrishna B. Prakash, The Chief Prose-
cutor, 73 Geo Wash L Rev 521, 575 (2005) (arguing that the president's constitutional duty to
faithfully execute the laws prevents him from giving prosecutors total autonomy, even if he were
so inclined).
53 See note 46 and accompanying text.
54 487 US at 705 (Scalia dissenting).
55 See, for example, Calabresi and Prakash, 104 Yale L J at 570-71 (cited in note 13) (ar-
guing that the linguistic similarity between the Vesting Clause of Article II and Article III sug-
gests Article II should be read as a general grant of power). For a discussion of the judiciary's
inherent powers and the Vesting Clause, see Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Ar-
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such as command of the military, pardons, and execution of the laws,
are executive in nature.6 Other clauses in § 2, such as the Appoint-
ments and Treaty Clauses, do not create a new species of hybrid ex-
ecutive-legislative powers. Instead, they represent a dilution of the
unitary nature of the executive branch by inclusion of the Senate in its
operations, much as the president takes part in the legislative function
of passing laws through the conditional veto.7 "The general doctrine
then of our constitution is, that the Executive Power of the Nation is
vested in the President," Hamilton wrote in 1793, "subject only to the
exceptions and qu[a]lifications which are expressed in that instru-
ment."'" Those exceptions, moreover, ought "to be construed strictly.""
Choosing the appropriate rule of construction can determine the
outcome of the debate over the president's removal power. Article II
of the Constitution only discusses the method of appointment of fed-
eral officers. The president "shall nominate, and by and with the Ad-
vice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other pub-
lic Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other
Officers of the United States," except for inferior officers, who may be
appointed solely by the president, the courts, or department heads."'
The Constitution's silence on removal could be taken to adopt the
formal process in which a legal act to reverse a previous act must fol-
low the same procedure-just as it takes the enactment of a law to
repeal an earlier law (the Constitution does not address the repeal of
legislation, only its enactment), the removal of an officer should fol-
low the same process as his appointment. Or the Constitution might
leave the decision up to Congress. Its authority under the Necessary
and Proper Clause to create agencies to help it exercise its Article I,
§ 8 powers could include the conditions for the removal of officers, as
well as the size, shape, and duties of the agencies themselves."
ticle III: Separating the Two Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 BU L Rev 205, 229-30 (1985) (ar-
guing that if Congress creates an exception to the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction pur-
suant to the Article III "exceptions clause," it "must create an inferior federal court to hear such
cases at trial or on appeal").
56 See Calabresi and Prakash, 104 Yale L J at 578-79 (cited in note 13) (noting that the
limitations placed upon these powers were meant to make them "executive," as opposed to
monarchical).
57 Id (arguing that the limitations were necessary to prevent the creation of near-boundless
executive power).
58 Hamilton, Pacificus No I at 39 (cited in note 11).
59 Id at 42.
60 US Const Art II, § 2, cl 2.
61 US Const Art I, § 8, cl 18.
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To put it charitably, the Supreme Court has taken inconsistent
positions on these arguments. In Myers v United States," former Presi-
dent and Chief Justice William H. Taft held that Congress could not
require Senate advice and consent before the president could remove
a first class postmaster. 3 Examining the creation of the great Depart-
ments in 1789, Chief Justice Taft found that the first Congress had un-
derstood the Constitution to vest the removal power in the president,
a significant fact because many of the Framers sat in the first Con-
gress.M Taft rejected the notion that Congress could set the conditions
for removal as part of its legislative power to establish agencies.65 As
he wrote, "[T]he power of appointment and removal is clearly pro-
vided for by the Constitution, and the legislative power of Congress in
respect to both is excluded save by the specific exception as to inferior
offices... ."' Such power in the hands of Congress, Taft observed,
would upset the independence of the three branches of government.
"It could never have been intended to leave to Congress unlimited
discretion to vary fundamentally the operation of the great indepen-
dent executive branch of government and thus most seriously to wea-
ken it."'7 Practical experience buttressed the conclusions of logic.
"Made responsible under the Constitution for the effective enforce-
ment of the law," Taft argued, "the President needs as an indispensable
aid to meet it the disciplinary influence upon those who act under him
of a reserve power of removal."' Without complete control over re-
moval, Taft concluded, the president would be prevented from "de-
62 272 US 52 (1926).
63 Id at 176.
64 Id at 111-12:
In the House of Representatives of the First Congress, on Tuesday, May 18,1789, Mr. Madi-
son moved in the Committee of the Whole that there should be established three executive
departments-one of Foreign Affairs, another of the Treasury, and a third of War-at the
head of each of which there should be a Secretary, to be appointed by the President by and
with the advice and consent of the Senate, and to be removable by the President. The com-
mittee agreed to the establishment of a Department of Foreign Affairs, but a discussion en-
sued as to making the Secretary removable by the President. "The question was now taken
and carried, by a considerable majority, in favor of declaring the power of removal to be in
the President."
65 Id at 126-27.
66 Myers, 272 US at 126-27.
67 Id at 127 (rejecting a "whole power of removal" for Congress as being "quite out of
keeping with the plan of government devised by the framers").
68 Idat 132.
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termining the national public interest" and "directing the action to be
taken by his executive subordinates to protect it.' '69
Yet, only nine years later, the Court cut back the reach of Myers.
While the president might have the authority to remove a postmaster,
he did not necessarily enjoy the same power over a member of the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC). In Humphrey's Executor, the Court
took up the constitutionality of the basic structure of the New Deal's
independent agencies,70 which prohibited the president from removing
agency heads except "for cause."7 With Justice George Sutherland
writing, the majority held that the FFC "cannot in any proper sense be
characterized as an arm or an eye of the executive."' Creating a whol-
ly new category of government, Justice Sutherland described the
FTC's functions as "quasi legislative or quasi judicial powers" because
it investigated and reported to Congress and conducted initial adjudi-
cations on claims of anticompetitive violations before a case went to
federal court." The FTC acted "as an agency of the legislative and
judicial departments," and was "wholly disconnected from the execu-
tive department.,'
Bowsher and Chadha may have encouraged Reagan administra-
tion officials in the hope that the Court was ready to overrule
Humphrey's Executor. But their campaign before the justices crested
when it confronted the independent agencies. Morrison addressed the
independent counsel's investigation of Ted Olson for advising the
president, while Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Legal
Counsel, to invoke executive privilege against a congressional investi-
gation into the EPA." After President Ronald Reagan exercised the
privilege and a compromise was reached, the committee claimed that
Olson had misled Congress.6 Upon the referral of the chairman of the
congressional committee, the Attorney General asked for an indepen-
69 Id at 134 (emphasizing that requiring the president to go through the Senate "might make
impossible that unity and co-ordination in executive administration essential to effective action").
70 The FTC itself was created in 1914, but the structure of independent agencies did not
truly begin to blossom until the New Deal. See Lewis, Presidents and the Politics of Agency De-
sign at 42-43 (cited in note 34) (noting the expansion of administrative agencies that accompa-
nied the New Deal and World War II).
71 Humphrey's Executor, 295 US at 619 (inquiring whether the president can be restricted
from firing agency heads for reasons beyond those statutorily enumerated).
72 Id at 628 (noting that the FTC's function is meant to be "free from executive control").
73 Id.
74 Id at 630.
75 487 US at 665 (explaining that Olson's advice led to an administrator withholding doc-
uments, leading to House condemnation and a lawsuit).
76 Id at 666.
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dent counsel." Olson challenged the constitutionality of the indepen-
dent counsel's appointment and removal provisions while the Iran-
Contra affair was unfolding, and prevailed in the US Court of Appeals
for the DC Circuit."
Rejecting Humphrey's Executor's summoning forth of quasi func-
tions, the Court returned to a cleaner separation of powers among
simple executive, legislative, and judicial powers. Congress cannot in-
terfere with the president's executive power or his constitutional re-
sponsibility to execute the laws, and, according to Chief Justice Wil-
liam Rehnquist's opinion for the Court, there was no doubt that the
independent counsel's functions were executive. 9 Unlike Bowsher,
however, Congress did not retain control over the independent coun-
sel." Here, Congress had only placed a restriction on the prosecutor's
removal, but sought no power to direct her itself (a conclusion belied
by the facts of Olson's case itself, which arose from a dispute between
Congress and the executive branch and an investigation demanded by
a congressional committee)." According to the Court, the president
could continue to command the independent counsel even with the
good cause removal provision." While there was some reduction in the
president's authority, the Court believed it was outweighed by the im-
portance of establishing independence for those who would investi-
gate the highest-ranking executive branch officials." "Frequently an
issue of this sort will come before the Court clad, so to speak, in
sheep's clothing," Justice Scalia declared in his Morrison dissent.'M
"But this wolf comes as a wolf."" The independent counsel, in his view,
violated the Constitution's vesting of all of the executive power in the
president, and upset the political functioning of the separation of
77 Id (noting that the Public Integrity Section of the Justice Department recommended an
independent counsel for all three persons suspected of interference, but that the attorney general
only approved one for Olson).
78 In re Sealed Case, 838 F2d 476, 487 (DC Cir 1988) (holding the appointment of the inde-
pendent counsel unconstitutional).
79 Morrison, 487 US at 691 ("There is no real dispute that the functions performed by the
independent counsel are 'executive' in the sense that they are law enforcement functions that
typically have been undertaken by officials within the Executive Branch.").
80 Id at 686 (noting that the act specifically gave removal authority to the attorney general).
81 Id at 694 (observing that "this case does not involve an attempt by Congress to increase
its own powers at the expense of the Executive Branch").
82 Id at 692 (arguing that the removal provision does not "impermissibly burdenf the
President's power to control or supervise the independent counsel").
83 Morrison, 487 US at 691-96 (noting that the impingement upon the powers of the presi-
dency is comparatively slight).
84 Id at 699 (Scalia dissenting).
85 Id.
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powers by releasing a politically unaccountable and unrestrained
prosecutor whose job would be to pursue selected executive branch
officials.6 The following decade fulfilled Justice Scalia's prophecies. At
least five independent counsel investigations targeted Clinton admin-
istration cabinet members, including the secretaries of commerce,
housing, and agriculture, with a sixth, the most serious and damaging
to the Presidency, focused on the web of scandals known as "Whitewa-
ter," which led to President Bill Clinton's impeachment."
Steven Calabresi has been one of the staunchest defenders of the
Reagan administration's efforts to restore the unitary executive to
constitutional law. Earlier scholars had addressed the centralization of
control over the administrative state in the president, but primarily in
functionalist rather than formalist terms." In 1992, Calabresi published
an article in the Harvard Law Review with Kevin Rhodes arguing that
Article II's Vesting Clause, like that of Article III for the federal judi-
ciary, was a reservoir of implied executive power. In 1994, he co-
wrote an article with Saikrishna Prakash in the Yale Law Journal
claiming that the history of the Constitution's drafting and ratification
supported his textualist arguments.
Defenders of the approach set forth by Morrison provided sever-
al responses. One argument, developed by Professors Lawrence Lessig
and Cass Sunstein, countered Calabresi and Prakash's formalist argu-
86 Id at 703-16 (Scalia dissenting).
87 See Robert J. Spitzer, The Independent Counsel and the Post-Clinton Presidency, in
David Gray Adler and Michael A. Genovese, eds, The Presidency and the Law: The Clinton
Legacy 89, 93-94 (Kansas 2002) (noting that at least nine independent counsels pursued investi-
gations during the Clinton administration); Richard A. Posner, An Affair of State: The Investiga-
tion, Impeachment, and Trial of President Clinton 59-94 (Harvard 2000) (detailing the Starr
investigation and the controversy surrounding it).
88 See, for example, Strauss, 84 Colum L Rev at 592 (cited in note 40) (arguing that "political
factors rather than law" are the primary arbiters of oversight relationships); Geoffrey P. Miller,
Independent Agencies, 1986 S Ct Rev 41, 44 (resting his thesis that "Congress may not constitution-
ally deny the President the power to remove a policy-making official who has refused an order of
the President ... on a model of the President's relationship to the federal administrative state");
Stephen L. Carter, The Independent Counsel Mess, 102 Harv L Rev 105, 107-08 (1988) (locating
congressional attempts to rein in executive power as reactions to the Watergate scandal).
89 Steven G. Calabresi and Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary Execu-
tive, Plural Judiciary, 105 Harv L Rev 1153, 1175-79 (1992) (reading the text of the Vesting
Clause to give a substantive grant of power). See also Lee S. Liberman, Morrison v. Olson: A
Formalistic Perspective on Why the Court Was Wrong, 38 Am U L Rev 313, 314 (1989) (arguing
that the Vesting Clause "does two things: it grants the President the entire executive power of
the United States, and grants it to him alone").
90 Calabresi and Prakash, 104 Yale L J at 599-635 (cited in note 13) (outlining the pre-
ratification understanding of the president's administrative role).
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ments for a unitary executive with a formalist argument of their own."
They claim that a fourth type of government power, that of "adminis-
tration," does not fall within the executive power of Article II and could
be subject to congressional regulation- including limitations on presi-
dential removal of agency officials.' Jerry Mashaw's recent history of
the administrative state similarly concludes that administration was
separate and distinct from the executive power vested by Article II.9,
Under these theories, the current evolution of the administrative state
into decentralized, relatively independent entities falls within the
markers set out by the Constitution's text and the immediate practice
that followed its ratification.
A second defense of a nonunitary executive takes a decidedly
functionalist approach. Drawing on Justice Byron White's dissents in
Bowsher and Chadha, functionalists argue that the insulation of agen-
cies from presidential control, like the legislative veto, formed part of
the legislative-executive bargain, making delegation to the agencies
possible." The formal rules defining the executive and legislative pow-
ers present the government with the possibility of a Coasean bargain.
In agreeing upon the legislative veto or for-cause removal, the presi-
dent and Congress have contracted around the separation of powers
to reach a level of delegation which they both want, but which is not
necessarily permitted by the formal rules. Presidents agree to these
conditions because without them, Congress would delegate little ad-
ministrative authority at all. Put more conventionally, Congress's
broad delegation of authority to the executive justifies new forms of
checks and balances on the president to correct the imbalance in the
separation of powers."
91 Lessig and Sunstein, 94 Colum L Rev at 38-55 (cited in note 13).
92 Id (arguing that the founding generation understood a distinction between "administra-
tive" and other executive powers).
93 See Jerry L. Mashaw, Recovering American Administrative Law: Federalist Foundations,
1787-1801, 115 Yale L J 1256, 1271 (2006) ("The Constitution's silence on most matters adminis-
trative provides extremely modest textual support for the notion that all administration was to
be firmly and exclusively in the control of the President."); Jerry L. Mashaw, Reluctant National-
ists: Federal Administration and Administrative Law in the Republican Era, 1801-1830,116 Yale L
J 1636, 1657 (2007) (claiming that the embargo of 1807-09, "like any system of administrative
implementation under the American Constitution, was subject ... to three forms of control:
political control by elected officials; administrative control through hierarchal supervision; and
legal control through judicial review"); Jerry L. Mashaw, Administration and "the Democracy":
Administrative Law from Jackson to Lincoln, 1829-1861, 117 Yale L J 1568, 1666 (2008) (detail-
ing administrative controls in the Jackson administration).
94 See, for example, Strauss, 84 Colum L Rev at 581-83 (cited in note 40).
95 Id at 667-69 (arguing that contemporary political realities require a recalibration of the
eighteenth century model of checks and balances).
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Both defenses of Morrison -formalist and functionalist -depend
on practice as their chief form of evidentiary support. To Lessig and
Sunstein, and to Mashaw, the historical record of the first agencies
shows that the Framers did not understand the formal constitutional
text to require that all administrative agencies fall within the direct
control and removal authority of the president.6 Instead, some agen-
cies, particularly the Post Office or the Treasury Department, occupied
a space that was neither legislative nor executive. For functionalists
who apply rational choice models, the modern administrative state is
the product of a series of bargains in which presidents have accepted a
degree of independence for agencies in exchange for sweeping delega-
tions of substantive power." Practice shows that presidents not only
have consented, but have actively desired limitations on their removal
authority as the price for access to regulatory powers otherwise for-
bidden to them.98
It is within this context that Calabresi and Yoo's book should be
understood. The Unitary Executive answers the claims of defenders of
Morrison that practice justifies the independence of the modern ad-
ministrative state. It systematically surveys the administration of each
president to show that no chief executive has ever consented to limita-
tions on his authority to remove and direct subordinate branch offi-
cials. They speak in particular to scholars who interpret the Constitu-
tion along common law methods." To them, Calabresi and Yoo "claim
only that the executive branch's consistent opposition to congressional
96 See Lessig and Sunstein, 94 Colum L Rev at 38-70 (cited in note 13) (examining the
nineteenth century view of executive versus administrative functions); Mashaw, 115 Yale L J at
1270-76 (cited in note 93) (arguing against a textualist warrant for unifying the executive and
administrative functions); Mashaw, 116 Yale L J at 1695 (cited in note 93) (noting that "the his-
torical record seems barren of any claim of inherent executive authority to regulate foreign
commerce, even though the embargo was motivated entirely by foreign affairs concerns and was
explicitly justified as a substitute for war"); Mashaw, 117 Yale L J at 1684-93 (cited in note 93)
(outlining the various "accountability systems" which check administrators).
97 For an analysis of rational choice decisionmaking in the context of the executive branch,
consider Nelson Lund, Rational Choice at the Office of Legal Counsel, 15 Cardozo L Rev 437,
486-504 (1993).
98 For example, Thomas Jefferson "was given enormous statutory discretion under the
embargo statutes, but one of his first acts was to issue an interpretation limiting his own authori-
ty." Mashaw, 116 Yale L J at 1685-86 (cited in note 93). See also Lewis, Presidents and the Politics
of Agency Design at 71 (cited in note 34) ("If presidents must choose between no agency and an
agency that is more insulated than they prefer, they often will accept the proposal for the insu-
lated agency.").
99 See, for example, David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U Chi
L Rev 877, 879 (1996) ("The common law approach [to constitutional interpretation] restrains
judges more effectively, is more justifiable in abstract terms than textualism or originalism, and
provides a far better account of our practices.").
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incursions on the unitary executive has been sufficiently consistent
and sustained to refute any suggestion of presidential acquiescence in
derogations from the unitary executive" (p 16). In this sense, their ex-
haustive description of presidential practice makes a difference, for the
purpose of constitutional interpretation (as opposed to pure historical
interest), only to the extent one thinks that practice can or should im-
pose a gloss on the Constitution's text and original understanding. And,
to put it more narrowly, it matters only insofar as one thinks that the
practice of the executive branch, rather than the decisions of the Su-
preme Court or the acts of Congress, should have at least an equal
weight in interpreting the extent of executive power. The next Part asks
whether Calabresi and Yoo have in fact proven their case.
II. REMOVAL IN PRACTICE
The Unitary Executive represents a tremendous amount of work.
It systematically examines every administration from Washington to
George W. Bush for signs that a president voluntarily accepted the
idea that Congress could condition his removal power. This provides a
historical comprehension that can be all too lacking in separation of
powers debates, which often contrive a conflict between the Framers'
understanding of the Constitution and modern practice. Much like
David Currie's history of the Constitution in Congressj o The Unitary
Executive serves as a unique reference work that provides the basic
information on each president and his interaction with Congress and
the courts on the important question of the structural integrity of the
executive branch. It deserves to be a standard resource for any legal
research on presidential administration.
This systematic approach has both its upsides and downsides. It
produces some gems that might go unnoticed when following a specif-
ic issue over time, rather than comparing presidents against one
another. Legal scholarship on the Presidency tends to focus on the
Framing period and modern controversies, usually with the purpose of
showing similarities or differences between the two. This method un-
fortunately overlooks the development in institutions over time and
the way that constitutional questions have changed in response to cir-
cumstances. Focusing only on the Framing and contemporary issues
100 See generally David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: The Federalist Period, 1789-1801
(Chicago 1997); David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: The Jeffersonian4 1801-1829 (Chicago
2001); David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: Democrats and Whigs 1829-1861 (Chicago 2005);
David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: Descent into the Maelstrom, 1829-1861 (Chicago 2006).
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also causes us to forget important American leaders and how they
confronted challenges that may not be all that different from our own.
According to Calabresi and Yoo, for example, the three greatest
defenders of their conception of a unitary executive are Andrew Jack-
son (no surprise there), Grover Cleveland, and Calvin Coolidge
(pp 268-69). Jackson's veto of the bill rechartering the Second Bank
of the United States, and his firing of his Treasury Secretary when he
refused to remove federal deposits from the Bank, are relatively well
known. But the latter two may surprise constitutional law scholars, for
whom Cleveland and Coolidge are best left to obscurity. Cleveland,
known as the only president to hold nonconsecutive terms in office,
can claim responsibility for repealing the Tenure in Office Act,", which
had limited presidential removal power from the days of Andrew
Johnson's impeachment. Coolidge, better known for his declaration
that "the business of America is business," wins praise from Calabresi
and Yoo for litigating and winning Myers v United States.l° Heroes of
the unitary executive may not correlate with popular or scholarly con-
ceptions of presidential success-an interesting question that the au-
thors do not take up.
The historical approach sheds light on otherwise unnoticed
themes and patterns. One issue that comes through in sharp relief, but
whose salience has receded today, is civil service reform. Calabresi and
Yoo argue that the creation of the civil service did not initially threat-
en the president's appointment and removal powers, even though it
required competitive examinations for federal employment (pp 7, 207,
422-23). Rather, in their view, the civil service helped presidents fend
off pressure from their political supporters to continue a partisan-
minded spoils system (pp 207, 422-23). They argue, convincingly, that
civil service reforms allowing the termination of federal employees
"for cause" were not understood to limit the president's removal au-
thority, or to the extent that they did, they only required the president
to give a "cause," any "cause," for termination (pp 422-23). Yet, over
time the tenure-like protections for the civil service have sharply re-
duced the president's ability to change the direction of the permanent
bureaucracy, to the point where scholars in the 1970s identified the
civil service as an obstacle to improving the responsiveness and effec-
101 An Act Regulating the Tenure of Certain Civil Offices ("Tenure of Office Act" or "Te-
nure Act"), 14 Stat 430 (1867).
102 272 US at 52.
1956 [76:1935
Unitary, Executive, or Both?
tiveness of government."° Interestingly, Calabresi and Yoo trace the
ossification of the bureaucracy from the Supreme Court's extension of
due process protections to the termination of government employees
in cases like Board of Regents v Roth,3" Perry v Sindermann,°" and Ar-
nett v Kennedy,' rather than any action by Congress. The Unitary Ex-
ecutive's historical approach shows that presidents consistently fol-
lowed a common position toward the civil service that sought to main-
tain the right to fire federal employees in order to guarantee a uni-
form execution of federal law.
The account would have been complete if it had delved more
deeply into actual practice that went beyond presidential, judicial, or
congressional statements. Calabresi and Yoo, for example, could have
conveyed some sense of how widely presidents used their authority to
remove members of the civil service. Even if the Supreme Court made
clear in 1903, in Shurtleff v United States,°7 that Congress's use of a for-
cause restriction did not limit the president's removal power, it would
still be important to know how the presidents and Congress lived by
the decision. Shurtleff itself, as the authors admit, is unclear and seems
to assume that Congress actually could limit the president's removal
power, if the statute plainly stated so (pp 234-35). One could read
Shurtleff as simply avoiding the constitutional question. In that case, it
would be important to know whether presidents continued to remove
civil servants for reasons other than inefficiency, neglect, or malfeas-
ance in office, or whether they believed that for-cause provisions li-
mited their authority. Even if Shurtleff implied that the heads of the
Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) and the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) were removable by the president at will, if remov-
al rarely if ever happened, it may be the case that presidents actually
believed the Constitution favored Congress. Conversely, it would be
important to understand whether the 1970s due process cases protect-
ing public sector employees had the effect that the authors suppose. If
103 See, for example, Gerald E. Frug, Does the Constitution Prevent the Discharge of Civil
Service Employees?, 124 U Pa L Rev 942,943-45 (1976).
104 408 US 564,569-70 (1972).
105 408 US 593,602-03 (1972) (holding that where a college had a de facto policy of tenure
renewal, the individual was entitled to a formal hearing where he might prove the legitimacy of
his claim to job tenure).
106 416 US 134, 152-55 (1974) (holding that the right not to be discharged except for cause
does not include the post-termination right to an adversary hearing).
107 189 US 311, 317 (1903) ("[I]t would be a mistaken view to hold that the mere specifica-
tion in the statute of some causes for removal thereby excluded the right of the President to
remove for any other reason which he ... should think sufficient.").
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it became more difficult for presidents to remove, and hence control,
the civil service after Roth, Sindermann, and Arnett, we might expect
fewer removals or at least a reduction in turnover in the federal work-
force. It is possible, of course, that the mere existence of the authority
guaranteed presidential control over the bureaucracy, but examples
would be helpful.
Another intrusion into the classic separation of powers, the inde-
pendent agencies, also takes on a different cast through Calabresi and
Yoo's approach. According to them, early agencies such as the ICC, the
Federal Reserve Board, and the FTC were not understood to be formally
independent until 1935, when the Court decided Humphrey's Executor
(p 300). Until then, removal of members of these commissions, like the
members of the civil service, fell under the Shurtleff rule, which held that
a statutory provision allowing removal for inefficiency, neglect, or mal-
feasance in office did not restrict the president's independent constitu-
tional power of removal. Even the Federal Reserve Board, whose inde-
pendence seems the most defensible on functional grounds-we do not
want elected politicians setting monetary policy because of their short-
term interest in reelection-was not originally understood to be inde-
pendent of presidential removal and control (p 259).
The example of the Federal Reserve could even allow for a test
of the removal power's significance. Calabresi and Yoo could have
researched how many Federal Reserve officials were removed by
presidents from Woodrow Wilson through FDR. Since we have very
good information on interest rates during this period, perhaps it would
have been possible to determine whether the pace and timing of re-
movals had any effect on interest rates. It would be interesting to
know whether the introduction of removal protections for the Federal
Reserve produced any real difference in the Bank's manipulation of
interest rates or its success in managing inflation and economic
growth. Some scholars have argued, for example, that interest rates
tend to loosen as a presidential election approaches, which suggests
that presidents are influencing the Fed to increase economic growth in
the short run for their electoral benefit. ' If that is true, that might
both bolster and harm Calabresi and Yoo's argument. It would show
that presidents can implement their policies even in the face of for-
108 See, for example, Edward Thfte, Political Control of the Economy 142-44 (Princeton
1980) ("The electoral-economic cycles breeds a lurching, stop-and-go economy the world over.");
William Nordhaus, The Political Business Cycle, 42 Rev Econ Stud 169, 187-90 (1975) ("Moreo-
ver, within an incumbent's term in office there is a predictable pattern of policy, starting with
relative austerity in early years and ending with the potlatch right before elections.").
1958 [76:1935
Unitary, Executive, or Both?
cause removal provisions, but it would also undermine the importance
of the removal question overall.
One downside of a chronological approach, however, is its sacri-
fice of analytical depth. The Unitary Executive attempts to say some-
thing about every president, no matter how obscure. Do we really
need to know what William Henry Harrison, Zachary Taylor, and
James Garfield, who collectively served about two years in office be-
fore their untimely deaths, thought about executive power? And the
effort to be comprehensive in this way tempts the authors to veer
from inference into speculation. Calabresi and Yoo, for example, argue
that Garfield supported their view of the unitary executive because,
several years before his election, he changed his view from support of
to opposition to the Tenure in Office Act (p 203). But in his inaugural
address, as the authors concede, Garfield asked Congress to enact leg-
islation that would limit the grounds for removal of "minor" executive
officials (pp 203-04). Garfield only served in office for six months be-
fore his assassination by a frustrated applicant for federal office; no
serious test of his views on the unitary executive truly occurred.
Devoting attention to presidents like Garfield, or even those who
served full terms that proved of little importance (Millard Fillmore
comes to mind, though rarely), can divert the analysis from truly con-
sequential presidents. Some of our greatest presidents, those acknowl-
edged to have vigorously used their substantive powers the most, are
also those who have defended Calabresi and Yoo's definition of the
unitary executive the least. Abraham Lincoln, for example, is probably
the president who pressed executive power to its farthest bounds
(more on that later).1" Yet, as the authors acknowledge, Lincoln also
signed legislation requiring Senate consent to remove the comptroller
of the currency, allowing presidential dismissal of a military officer to
undergo a review process and reversal by a court-martial, and de-
manding "cause" when firing consular clerks (p 172). And, of course,
Congress imposed the Tenure in Office Act upon the man who fi-
nished out Lincoln's second term. All too briefly, Calabresi and Yoo
suggest that Lincoln suffered these glaring intrusions into the struc-
tural integrity of the executive in order to expand his powers over the
109 See Abraham Lincoln, Letter to Albert G. Hodges (Apr 4, 1864), in Don E. Fehrenbach-
er, ed, Lincoln: Speeches and Writings 1859-1865 585, 585 (Library of America 1989) ("I felt that
measures, otherwise unconstitutional, might become lawful, by becoming indispensable to the
preservation of the constitution, through the preservation of the nation."). See also Schlesinger,
Jr, Imperial Presidency at 59 (cited in note 1) ("[Lincoln] obviously did not become a despot
lightly."); Clinton Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship: Crisis Government in the Modem Demo-
cracies 225 (Princeton 1948) (labeling Lincoln's presidency a "constitutional dictatorship").
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conduct of the war (p 172). This, however, fatefully links the idea of
the unitary executive in matters of personnel to the concept of the
executive power as including authorities of substance - a connection
that, as will be explored more fully in Part III, the authors do their
best to disavow. But if, as Calabresi and Yoo suggest in the conclusion
to their book, the president has few substantive powers, even in war-
time, then one of our three greatest presidents broke any chain of un-
animous presidential support for the unitary executive. Calabresi and
Yoo's account of Lincoln is disappointing on this score, and the likely
culprit is the decision to spend some pages discussing the Fillmores
and Taylors of the American past.
Another puzzle for Calabresi and Yoo is why, if presidents have
such a strong interest in defending the unitary nature of the executive
branch, Congress successfully enacted so many laws with for-cause
removal protections or legislative vetoes. Presidents can and have ve-
toed laws because of such provisions, such as Andrew Johnson's veto
of the Tenure in Office Act or Richard Nixon's veto of the War Powers
Resolution (pp 180, 352). Presidents sometimes must sign large omni-
bus laws that contain needed funding to keep the government operat-
ing even though they might contain provisions that intrude on their
executive powers. With increasing frequency, they have used signing
statements to object to such provisions. But even if one accepts that an
objection in a signing statement is enough to maintain a consistent
position in favor of a unitary executive, what are we to make of the
times when presidents have supported such legislation while remain-
ing silent on the constitutional problems?
A chief case in point is President Jimmy Carter. Carter had ac-
tually campaigned on the platform of making the Justice Department
independent of presidential control (p 363). Attorney General Griffin
Bell managed to torpedo the plan upon taking office (pp 363-64). But
the Carter administration then supported the Ethics in Government
Act, which created the office of the independent prosecutor and gave
it for-cause removal protection. Calabresi and Yoo explain Carter's
signing of the Act as "a small price to pay for the greater goal of pre-
venting a post-Watergate Congress from turning the whole Justice
Department into an independent agency" (p 366). Nevertheless, Cart-
er not only signed but actively supported the bill, which created one of
the greatest departures from the pure unitary ideal. Similarly, Carter
supported the statute that created the inspectors general in each de-
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partment (p 366)."' It is true that the head of OLC at the time, John
Harmon, testified against the constitutionality of the act. Nevertheless,
Carter signed it and since the act was not part of some larger omnibus
legislation, he did so willingly. It is hard to see why Carter, at least,
does not disrupt the authors' claim of an unbroken chain of presiden-
tial defense of the executive branch.
Carter, however, does not appear to be the only president who ac-
cepted congressional efforts to disrupt the executive branch's control
over law enforcement. It appears that Nixon and Ford, for example,
signed legislation that created legislative vetoes, though to be fair, they
sometimes did object (pp 352, 360). This practice goes back at least to
FDR, who approved legislation granting for-cause protections to New
Deal agencies, such as the National Labor Relations Board, or extend-
ing them to existing agencies, such as the Federal Reserve (p 287).
Several interesting questions arise from these examples. First, it is
not clear what the significance is, for purposes of constitutional inter-
pretation, of instances where presidents acquiesce to legislative intru-
sions into the unitary executive. Calabresi and Yoo explain that presi-
dential failure to oppose for-cause removal protections or legislative
vetoes does not undermine their thesis because those same presidents
objected in other cases. On Nixon, for example, they write that even
though he did accept such provisions, "his previous objections [in oth-
er cases] were doubtlessly sufficient to preserve his constitutional
challenge for the purposes of coordinate branch construction" (p 352).
Carter's support of the independent counsel law is justified by the
greater good of heading off an independent Justice Department, while
Reagan's and Clinton's agreement to the renewal of the Ethics in
Government Act is offset by their litigation against the Act (Reagan)
or just plain "foolishness" (Clinton) (pp 376-77, 400).
The authors do not explain why presidents who object some of
the time, but acquiesce other times, are consistent with their claim of
an unbroken defense of the unitary executive. The default rule could
just as easily run the other way: presidents have conceded the point
unless they consistently object to legislative vetoes or conditioned
removal provisions. This seems especially so given that presidents
have available in the signing statement a relatively costless tool to
register their objections, one not subject to interference from the oth-
er branches. A more fully developed theory of coordinate branch con-
110 The Inspector General Act of 1978, Pub L No 95-452, 92 Stat 1101, codified in various
sections of Title 5.
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struction could place these individual waivers, if they can be called
such, in an interpretive context that would help make sense of them.
Instead of finding a blanket uniformity of presidential practice,
which does not seem as neat as it first appears, Calabresi and Yoo could
have further investigated the cases in which presidents approved the
fragmentation of the executive branch. Under certain circumstances, it
seems, presidents will accept intrusions into the unitary executive. The
interesting question is why, when it comes at the cost of full presidential
control over policy. One possibility is that accepting for-cause removal
protections signals that the president can be trusted to keep certain
promises, whether to the electorate or to the other branches. The sepa-
ration of powers may create a bargaining environment where it is diffi-
cult to enforce commitments. Although judicial review may provide a
means to enforce some agreements, there can be significant justiciabili-
ty barriers that prevent courts from reaching many cases. Standing or
the political question doctrine, for example, can preclude courts from
resolving disputes over war powers and foreign affairs.'"
Presidents make commitments that may involve restricting their
own powers in order to receive valuable benefits in exchange. Accept-
ing devices that decrease their own control over personnel or law en-
forcement may be one of the few meaningful ways to signal their
trustworthiness. The Ethics in Government Act is a good example.
President Carter came to office on a platform of making a clean break
from the Nixon-Ford years and the interference with law enforcement
decisions that characterized Watergate (pp 364-66). He wanted to re-
store Americans' faith in their government (pp 365-66). One move-
ment toward restoring such trust was to promise that he and his top
advisors would follow exacting ethical standards. But after Watergate,
the electorate may not have fully believed promises of ethical conduct
without an institutional mechanism, like an independent counsel, who
could investigate allegations without interference from the president.
Such motives may explain why presidents have ultimately accepted
various independent investigatory commissions, such as those investi-
gating the 9/11 attacks (headed by former Governor Thomas Kean
and former Representative Lee Hamilton) or the failure of American
intelligence on the existence of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction
(headed by Judge Laurence Silberman and former Senator Charles
11 See, for example, Campbell v Clinton, 203 F3d 19,28 (DC Cir 2000) (per curiam) (holding that
whether president can initiate hostilities abroad without a declaration of war is a political question).
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Robb). Such commissions are a vehicle to signal the president's com-
mitment to investigating mistakes and instituting reforms.' 2
Another good example of an executive interest in administrative
independence is the Federal Reserve. Presidents will have a strong
incentive to loosen interest rates as their reelection approaches. The
economy may experience a short-term boost in economic growth with
artificially low unemployment and low interest rates, but at the price
of longer-term inflation. But that inflation will come to bear after the
election."' Investors will place less faith in the Federal Reserve if it is
known to manipulate interest rates to keep the existing political party
in power. They will expect inflation to increase, which will affect prices
and wages, causing inflation to grow even higher and reducing overall
social welfare. A president should favor central bank independence,
which correlates positively with political freedom, political stability,
and price stability.'
A second purpose served by such commitments is that they give
presidents a way to persuade Congress to delegate broad rulemaking
powers to the executive branch. It was President Herbert Hoover, for
example, who first suggested the legislative veto in order to convince
Congress to grant him significant authority to reorganize the execu-
tive branch."' During World War II, Congress enacted more than thirty
statutes giving the president wartime powers, but with a legislative
veto attached."6 As Justice White observed in dissent in Chadha,
"President Roosevelt accepted the veto as the necessary price for ob-
taining exceptional authority.""' By the time of Chadha, Congress had
inserted legislative vetoes in almost two hundred statutes covering
subjects from budgets to the environment."' While presidents objected
to many of these, as Justice White noted, "the Executive has more of-
ten agreed to legislative review as the price for a broad delegation of
112 See Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule, The Credible Executive, 74 U Chi L Rev 865,
868 (2007) (arguing that presidents are wise to use signaling mechanisms such as independent
commissions to prove their credibility to the public).
113 See note 108 and accompanying text.
114 See Dennis Mueller, Public Choice 111 461-66 (Cambridge 2003) ("Empirically [central
bank independence] appears to be positively correlated across countries with indexes of political
freedom and political stability.").
115 See Chadha, 462 US at 968-69 (White dissenting) (arguing that the legislative veto is a
prominent and important mechanism in the American political process).
116 Id at 969 (white dissenting).
117 Id.
118 id at 968.
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authority.'. 9 Presidents clearly would rather have such authority, even
with the legislative veto, than have no delegated authority at all.
A third purpose might involve presidential and congressional de-
cisions to delegate authority based on their expectations about future
electoral changes. When the Presidency and Congress are in the hands
of the same political party, one would expect broader delegations of
authority with fewer strings attached than if the two institutions were
under separate control. Congress will simply delegate broadly to the
president for reasons of technical expertise and efficiency in lawmak-
ing. But if the political party is unsure whether its electoral advantage
will persist over time, it may well wish to introduce independence in
the bureaucracy to prevent the other party from undoing its handi-
work. For example, if the Democratic Party controls both Congress
and the Presidency, its preferences may be advanced by delegation to
an agency that can more effectively issue rules that broaden the reach
of regulation. Both the president and Congress can establish the agen-
cy's baseline policy preferences by being present at its creation. But if
the Democratic Party expects that it will lose the Presidency in the
near future, it cannot be certain that the executive branch will contin-
ue to pursue congressional preferences. Giving the agency indepen-
dence through for-cause removal protections, in some circumstances,
may be preferable to giving the president full control over the agency
when that president may be a political opponent in the future.
Presidents may have good reasons, in their view, to accept devia-
tions from a pure theory of a unitary executive. At times, they have
promoted agency independence; at other times, they have accepted it.
Calabresi and Yoo might have devoted more attention to these cases
of acquiescence rather than cases of objection. Situations in which
maintaining fidelity to a unitary executive actually has real costs may
prove more illuminating, as a matter of constitutional interpretation,
than rote recitations of principle. If presidents demonstrate more at-
tachment to the unitary executive at the price of narrower delegated
powers from Congress or decreased trust in their political commit-
ments, we can put more store in the meaningfulness of the practice's
value as some form of precedent.
I do not mean to take anything away from The Unitary Execu-
tive's value as a survey of presidential practice. The authors have illu-
minated swaths of history that have been terra incognita for constitu-
tional scholars. The book should be a starting point for anyone who
119 Chadha, 462 US at 974.
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conducts separation of powers research on a specific historical period.
But because of its ambitious historical scope, The Unitary Executive
overlooks important questions about constitutional interpretation and
the significance of examples that weigh against their theory of consis-
tent presidential practice. For those who agree with the argument of
The Unitary Executive as a matter of the original understanding of the
Constitution, this nagging issue leaves uncertainty over whether the
book has proven its basic claim about historical practice.
III. Is REMOVAL ALL THERE IS?
The Unitary Executive may ultimately convince because its claims,
in its own words, are "for fairly modest presidential powers" (p 428).
Calabresi and Yoo make the case only for presidential direction of
whatever powers reside in the executive branch. On the question of
whether the executive branch itself has any substantive powers, they
claim to be "agnostic" (p 428).
But the authors cannot maintain their non-believer status for
long. The travails of the Bush administration force them to find reli-
gion, or rather in this case, apostasy. At first, they observe that Presi-
dent George W. Bush's claims to presidential power are "hardly un-
precedented" and follow in the footsteps of Presidents Jefferson, Lin-
coln, Theodore and Franklin Roosevelt, and Nixon (pp 428-29). On
the other hand, the authors assert that the writer of this Review, along
with other lawyers, provided poor legal advice to President Bush,
which led him to claim "implied, inherent presidential power in the
War on Terror" (p 429). These claims to power, they believe, have
committed the offense of giving the unitary executive theory a bad
name. Most directly, Calabresi and Yoo declare: "Although Bush de-
serves a lot of credit for his steps to safeguard the country, the cost of
the bad legal advice that he received is that Bush has discredited the
theory of the unitary executive" (p 429). That theory, they emphasize,
only reaches as far as the "presidential authority to remove and direct
subordinate executive officials," but does not include "implied, inhe-
rent foreign policy powers, some of which, at least, the president simp-
ly does not possess" (p 429).
This Part addresses this claim directly. In short, it argues that the
story of the Presidency has not truly been one solely of whether the
president is really the chief of the executive branch. The central ele-
ment of the Presidency has been the growth of its executive powers,
not its powers of management. The Framers created the Presidency so
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that a branch of the government would always be "in being" and could
exercise substantive powers in times of crisis and emergency.n Indeed,
the basic theory of the unitary executive was born not out of a debate
over removal, but over President Washington's declaration of Ameri-
can neutrality during the wars of the French Revolution."' Our great-
est presidents did not succeed because they carefully husbanded the
removal power, but because they responded to great challenges using
every tool at their disposal, including their substantive powers as Chief
Executive and commander in chief. Authority through the removal and
command of subordinates no doubt was an element of executive power,
but it was secondary to the more important issue-the scope of the
president's constitutional authorities. In the interests of full disclosure, I
have been at work on a book making this argument, but not in the con-
text of responding to a claim that the executive power is limited to the
direction and removal of subordinate officials.ln
A. The Framing
The broad exercise of presidential power is not confined to the
twentieth or twenty-first centuries but represents the necessary ex-
pansion over two hundred years of the constitutional powers of the
office. It started with the Revolutionaries' efforts to avoid executives
who might become monarchs. By the time of the Constitution's ratifi-
cation, however, the Framers' views had evolved in favor of an inde-
pendent, forceful president. The Constitution devotes more of its at-
tention to listing the powers of Congress, but it deliberately paints the
president's powers in broad strokes. Our greatest presidents, from
George Washington onward, have filled in these sketchy outlines with
deeds -deeds that met national challenges, both foreign and domestic.
Presidential power has grown with the nation's power, both in our
constitutional law and in substance.
This insight can be traced at least as far back as Alexis de Toc-
queville. In his classic Democracy in America, he observed that the
120 John Locke, Two Treatises of Government §144 at 74 (Barnes & Noble 3d ed 1966) (J.W.
Gough, ed) (explaining that because legislatures could not always remain in session, society
requires "a power always in being, which should see to the execution of the laws that are made
and remain in force").
121 See Stanley Elkins and Eric McKitrick, The Age of Federalism 336-39 (Oxford 1993)
(explaining that there appeared to be unanimity between the Framers in regards to whether or
not America would be neutral in the French Revolution and that the decision was not brought
before Congress).
122 See John Yoo, Crisis and Command: A History of Executive Power from George Wash-
ington to George W. Bush (Kaplan 2010).
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Presidency was a relatively weak office because the armed forces were
tiny, the nation was protected from Europe by the oceans, and no nat-
ural enemies sat along its borders.2 "The President of the United
States is in the possession of almost royal prerogatives, which he has
no opportunity of exercising; and those privileges which he can at
present use are very circumscribed: the laws allow him to possess a
degree of influence which circumstances do not permit him to em-
ploy. 1 2' That would change, Toqueville predicted, as America grew. It
is in foreign relations "that the executive power of a nation is called
upon to exert its skill and its vigour."''  If the national security of the
country "were perpetually threatened, and if its chief interests were in
daily connection with those of other powerful nations," Tocqueville
continued, "the executive government would assume an increased
importance in proportion to the measures expected of it, and those
which it would carry into effect."2'
Many scholars, however, believe that the exercise of executive
power today runs counter to the original constitutional design.'2 This
group argues that the Revolution against King George III was part of
a larger rejection of executive authority and that the Presidency was
intended to be a narrow, limited office. The Framers would never have
intended to resurrect the same royal prerogatives that they had just
fought a war to overthrow.8This view of the Presidency diminishes its
constitutional authority and independence to that of a "clerk-in-chief"
whose main duty is to execute Congress's laws.
It is true that the revolutionaries rebelled against King
George III and his perceived oppressions of the colonies, but it does
not follow that they opposed the idea of executive power. To most of
those who gathered in Philadelphia in the summer of 1787, post-
Revolutionary efforts by the states to allow only weak executives with




126 Id (hypothesizing that in the future America's executive could be quite strong).
127 See, for example, Bruce Ackerman, The Failure of the Founding Fathers: Jefferson, Mar-
shall, and the Rise of Presidential Democracy 246 (Belknap 2005) (arguing that America does not
have a presidential system and the current state of American government has only arisen
through hard fought battles against executive encroachment of legislative power).
128 See, for example, Bruce Ackerman, Congressional Leadership is Necessary and Proper,
LA Times (Apr 2, 2007), online at http://www.latimes.com/news/opinionlla-op-
dustup2apr02,0,3065343.story?coll=la-opinion-center (visited Sept 22, 2009) ("The Constitution
was written by revolutionaries who had fought a war against the abuse of power by a king. The
very notion of royal prerogative was repugnant-and so it should remain.").
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fragmented functions and powers had largely failed.'9 Undermining
the integrity of the executive branch had led to unstable, oppressive
legislatures. The drafters of the Constitution came to Philadelphia in
large part to restore the independence and unity of the executive
branch- a republican, not a royal, restoration' °
Independence put American theories of governance to the test,
and they failed miserably. The Revolutionaries established one na-
tional charter, the Articles of Confederation, which soon proved crip-
pled from lack of executive organization and leadership.'31 The revolu-
tionists wrote their state constitutions to undermine the structural
integrity of the executive branch, and the results were legislative
abuse, special-interest laws, and weak governments." Dissatisfaction
with this state of affairs, even in a postwar time of relative peace and
prosperity, led American nationalists to draft a new Constitution that
would create a stronger, more independent executive branch within a
more powerful national form of government.' They would become
known as the Federalists.
Scholars often misunderstand the Articles of Confederation.'
m
Drafted in 1777 and ratified in 1781, the Articles established the first
American national government. Some have concluded that certain
powers were legislative, such as the power to make war, simply be-
cause the Articles of Confederation granted them to the Continental
Congress. Andrew Rudalevige is one such critic of presidential pow-
er who believes that the Articles lacked an independent executive
branch.'. This view mistakes the Articles of Confederation as creating
a legislature, which it did not. As Chief Justice John Marshall recog-
nized, "the confederation was, essentially, a league; and congress was a
129 See Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787 446-53 (North
Carolina 1969).
130 See Willi Paul Adams, The First American Constitutions: Republican Ideology and the
Making of the State Constitutions in the Revolutionary Era 271 (North Carolina 1980) (Rita and
Robert Kimber, trans); Charles C. Thach, Jr, The Creation of the Presidency, 1775-1789 65-123
(Baltimore 1923).
131 See text accompanying notes 193-94.
132 See text accompanying notes 194-97.
133 See text accompanying notes 201-71.
134 See Articles of Confederation (1778), reprinted in James Bayard, A Brief Exposition of
the Constitution of the United States 171-78 (Hogan & Thompson 1845).
135 Articles of Confederation Art VI, § 5 at 173 (cited in note 134). See, for example, Arthur
Bestor, Separation of Powers in the Domain of Foreign Affairs: The Intent of the Constitution
Historically Examined, 5 Seton Hall L Rev 527, 568 (1974); Raoul Berger, War-making by the
President, 121 U Pa L Rev 29,33 (1972).
136 See Andrew Rudalevige, The New Imperial Presidency 19 (Michigan 2005).
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corps of ambassadors."'.. It had neither power of taxation nor power
of internal legislation, and it was not chosen on the basis of popular
representation.' It had as much real legislative power in the United
States then as the United Nations has today.
Rather, the Articles of Confederation created America's national
executive, which inherited the Crown's imperial powers in the colo-
nies, while the states retained their legislative powers."' It kept "the
sole and exclusive right and power of determining on peace and war,"
entering into treaties, and conducting foreign relations.'" It had the
power to appoint committees and officers to administer federal law,
the central function of the executive. ' Congress's problem was not a
lack of executive power, but the way that power was organized and
supported. Initially, Congress created committees to carry out deci-
sions, a design that proved disastrous with troops in the field fighting
the British.' 2 In 1781, Congress replaced committees with executive
departments headed by individual secretaries, an improvement, 3 but
Congress continued to try to micromanage policy, and the executive
still lacked "method and energy," in the words of a young Alexander
Hamilton.'" The states, which continued to control supplies and inter-
nal legislation, failed to supply revenue to the national government or
137 John Marshall, A Friend of the Constitution Essays, July 9, 1819, reprinted in Gerald
Gunther, ed, John Marshall's Defense of McCulloch v. Maryland 199 (Stanford 1969) (explaining
the differences between the "league" created by the Articles of Confederation and the national
"government" created by the Constitution). See also Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent of the
Governed: Constitutional Amendment outside Article V, 94 Colum L Rev 457,465 (1994) (noting
that the "key point about the confederation was that it was a league, a treaty").
138 Articles of Confederation Arts II, V, VIII at 171-73 (cited in note 134). See Marshall, A
Friend of the Constitution Essays at 199 (cited in note 137).
139 See Jerrilyn Greene Marston, King and Congress 297-309 (Princeton 1987) (arguing that
"executive and administrative responsibilities that had been exercised by or under the aegis of
the king's authority" were confided "to the Congress," while the powers exercised by Parliament
were "firmly allocated to the states"); Jennings B. Sanders, Evolution of Executive Departments
of the Continental Congress 3-4 (North Carolina 1935) (arguing that there was disagreement
over whether executive powers should be inherited by Congress, the states, or departments other
than Congress); Thach, The Creation of the Presidency at 576-78 (cited in note 130) (arguing that
although there were some who wished the Presidency to have unfettered treaty power, power
was shared with the states); Wood, The Creation of the American Republic at 356 (cited in
note 129) (noting that "all final governmental, lawmaking power remained with the states").
140 Articles of Confederation Art IX at 173-76 (cited in note 134).
141 Articles of Confederation Art IX, § 5 at 175-76 (cited in note 134).
142 Glenn A. Phelps, George Washington andAmerican Constitutionalism 142-43 (Kansas 1993).
143 Id at 143.
144 Alexander Hamilton, Hamilton to James Duane, in Henry Cabot Lodge, ed, 1 Works of
Alexander Hamilton 219 (G.E Putnam's Sons 1904).
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to comply with its requests. ' This experience led General Washington
to forever favor placing responsibility for executive action in a single,
accountable leader.'-
Once peace arrived, Congress proved utterly incapable of han-
dling its executive duties.17 It could not establish even a small military
to protect northern forts near the Canadian border, which the British
refused to hand over as required by the 1783 peace treaty ending the
Revolutionary War.'  Britain and France imposed harmful trading
rules against American ships, while Spain closed the critical port of
New Orleans to American commerce.' American ambassadors could
do nothing because Congress had no authority over commerce with
which to threaten retaliation."" It could not even approve an agree-
ment with Spain, negotiated by John Jay, to reopen New Orleans and
thus the Mississippi, the chief route for American farm exports.5' Dis-
satisfaction with congressional weakness climaxed with Shays's Rebel-
lion in August 1786. A mob of two thousand men blocked the Massa-
chusetts legislature from meeting, though the discontents soon scattered
after a brief confrontation with state volunteers."2 Nationalists like
Henry Knox and George Washington exaggerated the threat into
twelve thousand soldiers who had threatened to rob banks and overth-
row the state government. 3 Congress's dismal record, and the looming
145 Frederick W. Marks, III, Independence on Trial: Foreign Affairs and the Making of the
Constitution 52-95 (Louisiana State 1973).
146 Phelps, George Washington and American Constitutionalism at 50-53 (cited in 142).
147 See, for example, Jack N. Rakove, The Beginnings of National Politics: An Interpretive
History of the Continental Congress 199-205 (Knopf 1979).
148 For a discussion of the problems in American foreign policy during this critical period,
see John Yoo, The Powers of War and Peace: The Constitution and Foreign Affairs after 9/11 73-79
(Chicago 2005) (concluding that the "story of the Continental Congress is a tale of failed at-
tempts to organize the executive, not legislative, power effectively"). See also Forrest McDonald,
E Pluribus Unum: The Formation of the American Republic 1776-1790 143-53 (Houghton Mifflin
1965); Marks, III, Independence on Trial at 3-51 (cited in note 145) (describing the inability of
Congress to provide for national security under the Articles of Confederation).
149 See Marks, III, Independence on Trial at 52-95 (cited in note 145) (describing the chal-
lenges of foreign trade restrictions in the immediate aftermath of the Revolution).
150 See id at 55 (noting that Britain's Lord Sheffield argued for strict trade limitations
against the Americans precisely because the American Congress was powerless to regulate
commerce).
151 See id at 26-35 (describing the negotiations between John Jay and the Spanish ambassa-
dor that stalled due in part to Congress's lack of power and cohesion).
152 See Clinton Rossiter, 1787: The Grand Convention 56 (Macmillan 1966) ("They called
impromptu conventions to demand changes in the state constitution, resisted payment of taxes
and fees, used force to prevent county courts from sitting, and finally rose in arms to march
hither and yon in search of justice.").
153 See Marks, III, Independence on Trial at 102-05 (cited in note 145).
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threat of chaos and disorder augured by Shays's Rebellion, was at the
forefront of the minds of the delegates as they met in Philadelphia.
Experimentation with the executive went to extremes in the
states. Some eliminated the independence of the governor's office."' In
all but one state, the assembly elected the governor, making clear who
served whom.'55 Some states tried executive committees or required
the governor's decisions to be approved by a council of state ap-
pointed by the legislature. "' As Professor Gordon Wood has observed,
the councils often made the governors "little more than chairmen of
their executive boards."'' 7 States limited the governor's term and eligi-
bility.'m Most states either provided for the annual election of the gov-
ernor, restricted the number of terms a governor could serve, or
both.' 9 Pennsylvania tested the farthest reaches of radicalism by re-
placing the single governor with a twelve-man executive council
elected annually by the legislature.'60 The Revolution had occurred
because the colonists wanted to maintain the independence of their
legislatures from the control of the British King-in-Parliament.16' Their
cure was to make the executive subordinate to the assemblies.
Some of the revolutionaries wanted to restrict the substance as
well as the structure of executive power. Thomas Paine's Common
Sense not only attacked the British monarchy, but it also called for an
end to executives in the colonies. '6' Paine proposed to his fellow Amer-
icans that they adopt governments run by legislatures, which would
have only a presiding officer. ' Thomas Jefferson's draft for the Virgin-
ia Constitution gave the governor the title merely of "Administra-
tor. ' " Jefferson enumerated the powers the executive could not exer-
154 Wood, The Creation of the American Republic at 138 (cited in note 129).
155 Id.
156 Id at 137-39.
157 Id at 138.
158 Wood, The Creation of the American Republic at 139-40 (cited in note 129).
159 Id.
160 See Pa Const § 19 (1776), reprinted in Francis N. Thorpe, 5 The Federal and State Consti-
tutions, Colonial Charters, and Other Organic Laws of the States, Territories, and Colonies 3086-87
(GPO 1909).
161 Wood, The Creation of the American Republic at 310-11 (cited in note 129).
162 Thomas Paine, Common Sense (1776), reprinted in Isaac Kramnick, ed, Thomas Paine
Common Sense 60, 90-98 (Penguin Classics 1986) ("But where says some is the King of Ameri-
ca? I'll tell you Friend, he reigns above ... so far as we approve of monarchy, that in America
THE LAW IS KING.").
163 Thach, The Creation of the Presidency at 29-30 (cited in note 130).
164 Thomas Jefferson, First Draft of the Virginia Constitution (1776), reprinted in Julian P
Boyd, ed, 1 The Papers of Thomas Jefferson 337, 341 (Princeton 1950) ("[T]he Executive powers
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cise: he could not dismiss the legislature, regulate the money supply,
set weights and measures, establish courts or other public facilities,
control exports, create offices, or issue pardons."' The Administrator
could not "declare war or peace, issue letters of marque or reprisal,
raise or introduce armed forces, or build armed vessels ... forts or
strongholds."1 "8 Although the draft left to the Administrator any re-
maining "powers formerly held by the king," there was little left."7
But most states either gave the governor exclusive power to de-
cide when to use the militia, or required that he consult the council
before calling in the military. ' Although Virginia prohibited the gov-
ernor from exercising any prerogative, it generally rejected Jefferson's
advice and authorized the governor, with the advice of a council of
state, to "exercise the Executive powers of Government.'6 States
sided with John Adams, who urged states to reproduce the forms and
powers of the British constitution after adjusting for popular sove-
reignty.7 His plan called for a governor, a commons, and a mediating
shall be exercised by an [Admr.] to be annually chosen on certain day but not to be invested with
powers of Adm. till one year after by the house of representatives.").
165 Id at 342 ("[H]e ... shall not have the prerogative of Dissolving [the] house of Repre-
sentatives[,] ... coining monies or regulating their value[,] regulating weights & measures[,]
erecting courts, offices, boroughs, corporations, fairs, markets, ports, beacons, light houses, sea-




168 In a typical example, Delaware declared that its "president, with the advice and consent
of the privy council, may embody the militia, and act as captain-general and commander-in-chief
of them, and the other military force of this State, under the laws of the same." Del Const Art IX
(1776), reprinted in Francis N. Thorpe, 1 The Federal and State Constitutions, Colonial Charters;
and Other Organic Laws of the States, Territories, and Colonies 562, 564 (GPO 1909). See also Md
Const Art XXXIII (1776), reprinted in Francis N. Thorpe, 3 The Federal and State Constitutions,
Colonial Charters, and Other Organic Laws of the States, Territories, and Colonies 1686, 1696
(GPO 1909) ("[T]he Governor, by and with the advice and consent of the Council, may embody
the militia."); NC Const Art XVIII (1776), reprinted in Thorpe, 5 The Federal and State Constitu-
tions 2787,2791 (cited in note 160) ("The Governor, for the time being, shall be captain-general and
commander in chief of the militia."); Pa Const § 20 (1776), reprinted in Thorpe, 5 The Federal and
State Constitutions 3081,3087-88 (cited in note 160) ("The president shall be commander in chief of
the forces of the state."); Vt Const Art XVIII (1777), reprinted in Francis N. Thorpe, 6 The Federal
and State Constitutions; Colonial Charters, and Other Organic Laws of the States Territories; and
Colonies 3737, 3745 (GPO 1909) ("The Governor shall be commander-in-chief of the forces of the
state."); Va Const (1776), reprinted in Francis N. Thorpe, 7 The Federal and State Constitutions;
Colonial Charters; and Other Organic Laws of the States, Territories; and Colonies 3812,3817 (GPO
1909) ("The Governor may embody the militia, with the advice of the Privy Council.").
169 The Constitution as Adopted by the Convention (June 29, 1776), reprinted in Thorpe, 1
The Federal and State Constitutions at 380 (cited in note 173); Va Const (1776), reprinted in
Thorpe, 7 The Federal and State Constitutions at 3816-17 (cited in note 168).
170 See, for example, John Adams, Thoughts on Government (1776), reprinted in Robert J.
Taylor, ed, 4 Papers of John Adams 86, 86-93 (Belknap 1979).
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senate."' According to Adams, "a people cannot be long free, nor ever
happy, whose government is in one assembly."" Adams gave the gov-
ernor a veto and control of the armed forces, rather than the legisla-
ture.' 3 He advised the adoption of an executive "who, after being
stripped of most of those badges of domination called prerogatives,
should have a free and independent exercise of his judgment, and be
made also an integral part of the legislature."... Although the states
experimented radically with the control of the executive branch, its
substantive powers remained relatively unchanged.
The revolutionaries saw no need to reduce the substance of the
executive power because they used constitutional structure to control
their executives. Most state constitutions gave assemblies the power to
choose their governors and allowed the executive to serve for only
one-year terms, often with a limit on reelection.7 These states further
bound their executives by requiring them to receive the consent of a
council of state before exercising any independent authority."
Only one state, New York, freed its governor from these legisla-
tive shackles. British occupation of New York City for most of the war,
and the terrible state of its security (the state legislature had to meet
in seven different locations during the first year of the war), gave its
inhabitants a reason to break ranks on a vigorous executive. New
York vested "the supreme executive power and authority of this
State" in a single governor. "' The people, not the assembly, elected
him, and there was no limit on the number of three-year terms he
could serve. No privy council was created to look over his shoulder,
only a council of appointment and a council of revision to review the
constitutionality of legislation. 9 The constitution vested him with the
position of "general and commander-in-chief of all the militia, and
admiral of the navy of this State"; the power to dismiss or call the leg-
islature into session and to issue pardons; and the duty to make rec-
ommendations for legislation and to "take care that the laws are ex-
171 See id at 88-91.
172 Id at 88.
173 Id at 89-90.
174 Adams, Thoughts on Government at 89 (cited in note 170).
175 Wood, The Creation of the American Republic at 138-40 (cited in note 129).
176 Id at 137-39.
177 See Thach, The Creation of the Presidency 34-35 (cited in note 130).
178 NY Const Art XVII (1777), reprinted in Thorpe, 5 The Federal and State Constitutions
2623,2632 (cited in note 160).
179 NY Const Arts VIII, XVII, XXIII (1777), reprinted in 5 The Federal and State Constitu-
tions at 2631-34 (cited in note 160); NY Const Arts III, XXIII (1777), reprinted in 5 The Federal
and State Constitutions at 2628-29, 2633-34 (cited in note 160).
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ecuted to the best of his ability..... The first governor, George Clinton,
won such success with these powers that the state returned him to
office for eighteen consecutive years, despite the British occupation.
Clinton, wrote fellow New Yorker Gouverneur Morris, could not have
been more suited to an office of such potential.'8. He was a man "who
had an aversion to councils, because, to use his own words, the duty of
looking out for dangers makes men cowards."'' 2
New York's definition of what fell within the executive power
remained fairly unexceptional. Indeed, it was similar to what Pennsyl-
vania had given its pitiful executive." It was only when these powers
were in the hands of an independent and unitary executive that vigor-
ous government emerged. These lessons did not go unnoticed. New
York's experience influenced not only the later constitution-writing
efforts of Massachusetts and New Hampshire, but also the work of the
Philadelphia Convention.' During the struggle for ratification, Pub-
lius expressed the thoughts of many when he declared that the New
York Constitution "has been justly celebrated both in Europe and in
America as one of the best of the forms of government established in
this country."' 8 As Charles Thach concluded, "[H]ere was a strictly
indigenous and entirely distinctive constitutional system, and, of
course, executive department, for the consideration of the Philadel-
phia delegates..'.
180 NY Const Arts XVIII, XIX (1777), reprinted in 5 The Federal and State Constitutions at
2632-33 (cited in note 160). During the Revolution, George Clinton, the state's first governor,
sent the militia on his sole authority to reinforce General Horatio Gates's campaign against
British forces. He later notified the legislature of the move in his first inaugural address.
Throughout the war, Clinton (himself a military officer) worked closely with General Washing-
ton and his subordinates to coordinate operations against the British. Although the legislature
expressed its views when appropriating funds for the war effort, the legislature generally obeyed
Clinton's wishes. See E. Wilder Spaulding, His Excellency George Clinton: Critic of the Constitu-
tion 95-98, 114-18 (Macmillan 1938) (describing Governor Clinton's substantial influence on
New York's tax policy and government finance).
181 Thach, The Creation of the Presidency at 37 (cited in note 130).
182 Id.
183 Compare NY Const Arts XVIII, XIX (1777) at 2632-33 (cited in note 160) with Pa
Const § XX (1776), reprinted in 5 The Federal and State Constitutions at 3087-88 (cited in
note 160).
184 See Rossiter, 1787: The Grand Convention at 59, 65 (cited in note 109) (noting the
agreement among the Framers that the "best previous efforts" to convert the "ideas of the revo-
lution" into institutions had "taken place in Massachusetts, Virginia, and New York"); Thach, The
Creation of the Presidency at 34-38 (cited in note 130).
185 Federalist 26 (Hamilton), in The Federalist 164, 167 (cited in note 6) (noting that New
York's constitution clearly delegated the power to raise armies to the legislature, not the executive).
186 Thach, The Creation of the Presidency at 43 (cited in note 130).
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The framing generation had learned another corollary to this les-
son. A legislature unbalanced by an independent executive brought its
own dangers. In states such as Pennsylvania -where the executive had
no veto, was straddled by a privy council, and was chosen by the as-
sembly-the legislature exercised virtually unlimited authority."' Dur-
ing the Constitutional Convention, James Madison argued that
"[e]xperience has proved a tendency in our governments to throw all
power into the legislative vortex. The Executives of the States are in
general little more than cyphers; the legislatures omnipotent."''. Legis-
lative supremacy produced such "instability and encroachment" that if
not checked, Madison predicted, "a revolution of some kind or the oth-
er would be inevitable."'" Though the colonies had won the Revolution,
unrestrained state legislatures failed to follow through on the 1783
Peace Treaty with Britain,'9° imposed destructive trade barriers, and
passed laws that oppressed minorities and property owners. Despite the
colonies' victory, the problems of government were so serious that his-
torians came to describe these years as the "Critical Period.' 9'
New York and Massachusetts provided the models for the dele-
gates who met in Philadelphia in the summer of 1787. They ended leg-
islative supremacy, created an independent executive, and restored
balance to their constitutions. The Framers could have followed the
path they knew best and treated the executive as Congress's "clerk-in-
chief," but instead they chose a less popular but more effective direc-
tion. By the end of the Critical Period's exuberant experimentation
with dominant legislatures, states began to opt for executives very
187 See id at 31-34.
188 Max Farrand, ed, 2 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 35 (Yale 1911).
189 Id (arguing that without a strong executive, the current government would dissolve).
190 Definitive Treaty of Peace between Great Britain and the United States, Sept 3, 1783, US-
Gr Brit, 48 Consol. TS. 487, reprinted in Clive Parry, ed, 48 The Consolidated Treaty Series: 1781-
1783 487,487-98 (Oceana 1969).
191 For a look at one of the most important documents revealing the Framers' thoughts on
the problem of state legislatures, see James Madison, Vices of the Political System of the United
States (Apr 1787), reprinted in Robert A. Rutland, et al, eds, 9 The Papers of James Madison 348,
348-57 (Chicago 1975) (opining that the problems experienced by the American Confederacy
were similar to those of all past confederacies and that such problems "result [ I naturally from
the number and independent authority of the states"). See also Charles E Hobson, The Negative
on State Laws: James Madison, the Constitution, and the Crisis of Republican Government, 36 Wm
& Mary Q 215, 223-25 (1979) (discussing Madison's disillusionment with "turbulent majorities
who ruled the state legislatures"). In examining Madison's thought during the Framing Period, I
also have relied upon Lance Banning, The Sacred Fire of Liberty: James Madison and the Found-
ing of the Federal Republic (Cornell 1996); Drew R. McCoy, The Last of the Fathers: James Madi-
son and the Republican Legacy (Cambridge 1989); and William Lee Miller, The Business of May
Next: James Madison and the Founding (1992).
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much like that of 1787.'92 Why? As Wood has argued, the Framers be-
lieved that the 1776 constitutions had been the product of excessive
revolutionary fervor.'9 Unchecked by independent executives and
judiciaries, the state legislatures had passed legislation infringing
property rights, cancelling debts, and oppressing minorities."" Factions,
or special-interest groups, working at the expense of the broader pub-
lic, had arisen. '9' Unrestrained democracy had produced sharp and
abrupt swings in policy that destabilized the newly independent
states.'% The movement to restrain out-of-control legislatures, at both
the state and national levels, proved so strong that Wood has likened it
to a "Thermidorian" reaction. '9
The object of this constitutional counterrevolution was a restored
executive to check the excesses of the legislature, control law en-
forcement, appoint and manage government personnel, and conduct
war and foreign relations. With Charles Louis de Secondat, Baron de
Montesquieu's ringing injunction that liberty could only survive with a
clear separation of the branches of government, the Framers arrived
at the Constitutional Convention determined to create an executive
that would be elected independently of the legislature and possess its
own inherent authorities, so as to confound factions and avoid the
legislative manipulation that the revolutionary states had expe-
rienced."9 As an authoritative work on the revolutionary constitutions
has observed, "[T]he reaction against the colonial governor was so
weak that it did not lead to parliamentary government with an execu-
tive committee of members of the legislature, but rather that within a
decade the American system of presidential government evolved with
full clarity and permanence."'
As noted in Part I, the constitutional text itself only briefly de-
scribes the executive power. The important question is whether the
Framers would have understood the phrase "the executive power," or
the Commander-in-Chief Clause, as continuing in the president pow-
ers that had traditionally belonged to British and colonial executives.
To answer this, it is more important to recapture the meaning held by
those who ratified the Constitution than those who drafted it during the
192 Wood, The Creation of the American Republic at 430-38 (cited in note 129).
193 Id at 430.
194 Id at 404-09.
195 Id at 502.
196 Wood, The Creation of the American Republic at 431-32 (cited in note 129).
197 Id at 446-53.
198 Id at 152.
199 Adams, The First American Constitutions at 271 (cited in note 130).
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Philadelphia Convention. The Constitutional Convention, encapsulating
discussion and votes at a single time and place, is understandably more
straightforward to study than the ratification process, which took place
over the course of a year at unruly ratifying conventions spread across
the country, in open-air and closed-door meetings, and in letters and
newspaper articles.2° Yet, the ratification debates arguably have greater
political legitimacy than the Philadelphia Convention.
The Federalists explained that limiting government power in
emergencies, as the Anti-Federalists wanted, would be foolhardy.
These powers, Hamilton argued in December 1787, "ought to exist
without limitation., 20 ' Echoing John Locke, he observed that the na-
ture and scope of emergencies were "impossible to foresee." Because
the "circumstances that endanger the safety of nations are infinite,"
Hamilton warned, "no constitutional shackles can wisely be imposed
on the power." Agreeing with his Federalist Papers co-author, Madi-
son chimed in: "The means of security can only be regulated by the
means and the danger of attack."' Madison concluded that "it is vain
to oppose constitutional barriers to the impulse of self-preservation. It
is worse than in vain; because it plants in the Constitution itself neces-
sary usurpations of power."' A constitution with a weak government
and executive, some Federalists argued, posed an even greater danger
of tyranny, for to survive in a dangerous world, the nation would be
forced to resort to actions the Constitution forbade.0 Insecurity was
ever-present in the Framers' minds, for the new republic was hemmed
in by the British to the North and the Spanish to the Southwest. 2W
This argument played into Anti-Federalist concerns about a cen-
tralized government that mingled specific powers. Federalists admit-
ted that the Constitution did not fully separate all legislative, execu-
tive, and judicial functions, but pointed to the British and state consti-
tutions which granted the executive a veto over legislation. A better
safeguard than complete separation, they argued, was to give each
branch incentives and the authority to check each other. In Federal-
200 For discussion of the ratification process, see Akhil Reed Amar, America's Constitution:
A Biography 5-8 (Random House 2005).
201 Federalist 23 (Hamilton), in The Federalist 146,147 (cited in note 6).
202 Id.
203 Id.
204 Federalist 41 (Madison), in The Federalist 268,270 (cited in note 6).
205 Id.
206 Id.
207 See text accompanying notes 148-49.
208 Federalist 51 (Madison), in The Federalist 347,348 (cited in note 6).
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ist 51, Madison wrote that power needed to align with self-interest:
"Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. The interest of the
man must be connected with the constitutional rights of the place."20
Competition among the branches would present the best protection.
As Madison wrote, "[T]he great security against a gradual concentra-
tion of the several powers in the same department, consists in giving
to those who administer each department, the necessary constitutional
means, and personal motives, to resist encroachments of the others.
2 10
Madison's reliance on structural checks and balances was a 180-
degree turn from the enthusiasms of the Revolution. As Gordon
Wood has emphasized, the revolutionaries put their faith in legisla-
tures as exemplars of popular sovereignty. The people could do no
wrong, so why restrict the power of their representatives? By 1788,
Federalists had come to see unlimited legislative power as presenting
its own problems. In a democracy, Madison wrote in Federalist 48, the
legislature held broader powers and access to the "pockets of the
people.212 He warned that "it is against the enterprising ambition of
[the legislature], that the people ought to indulge all their jealousy and
exhaust all their precautions..... He had seen the "impetuous vortex"
214
of the legislature in action in Virginia and Pennsylvania. How to
guard against unwise popular passions acting through the legislature?
"In republican government the legislative authority, necessarily, pre-
dominates." Madison wrote." So, "the weakness of the executive may
require, on the other hand, that it be fortified. 2 6
Hamilton followed Madison's contributions to The Federalist Pa-
pers with a more detailed and sophisticated discussion of the execu-
tive branch. While the divisions within a legislature might encourage
deliberation, they also tended to subject government decisions to
"every sudden breeze of passion" or "every transient impulse," espe-
cially those created by the flattering "arts of men.2 . Hamilton saw
that legislative sovereignty had its drawbacks, as when the legislature
sold out the long-term common good for short-term popularity or
209 Id at 349.
210 Id.
211 Wood, The Creation of the American Republic at 162-63 (cited in note 129).
212 Federalist 48 (Madison), in The Federalist 332,334 (cited in note 6).
213 Id.
214 See id at 333 (noting that in their fear of a tyrannical executive the drafters of the state
constitutions "seem never to have recollected the danger from legislative usurpations").
215 Federalist 51 (Madison) at 350 (cited in note 208).
216 Id.
217 Federalist 71 (Hamilton) at 482 (cited in note 6).
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political gain-a conventional idea today, but a radical one then."8 This
situation called for executive intervention. A vigorous executive could
protect against those "irregular and high handed combinations, which
sometimes interrupt the ordinary course of justice," and would pro-
vide a security against "enterprises and assaults of ambition, of faction
and of anarchy."'2 9 An executive did not owe an unjustified and "un-
bounded complaisance" to every sudden breeze of popular passion,
nor did he have obligations toward the "humors of the Legislature."220
A popularly elected executive serving a set term in office could block
"imperious," impetuous, or unwise legislative acts that merely catered
to a popular mood."' In his famous discussion of judicial review in Fe-
deralist 78, Hamilton used the same logic: each branch owed its ulti-
mate constitutional responsibility to the people, not to the legislature,
and could use its unique powers to negate unconstitutional actions of
the other branches."'
The revolutionary state constitutions had created obstacles to
good government, persuading the Convention delegates that a strong
executive and republican government were not incompatible but mu-
tually reinforcing.m "A feeble execution is but another phrase for a
bad execution," Hamilton argued in Federalist 70, "[a]nd a govern-
ment ill executed, whatever it may be in theory, must be in practice a
bad government. 2 . "[G]ood government" required "[e]nergy in the
executive," and a vigorous president was now seen as "essential to the
protection of the community against foreign attacks" and "the steady
administration of the laws."2'
Energy, in turn, depended on four pillars: unity, duration, financial
support, and "competent powers....6 First was "unity" in office. Con-
centrating executive power in one person would bring "decision, activ-
ity, secrecy, and dispatch," Hamilton wrote, echoing Niccolb Machia-
velli."' To diffuse executive power among multiple parties, or to re-
218 Id at 482-83.
219 Federalist 70 (Hamilton) at 471 (cited in note 8).
220 Federalist 71 (Hamilton) at 483 (cited in note 6).
221 Id at 482-84.
222 See Federalist 78 (Hamilton), in The Federalist 521,525 (cited in note 6).
223 Wood, The Creation of the American Republic at 432 (cited in note 129) (noting that
reformers agreed that the libertarian bias of the people had to be offset by an increase of magis-
terial power in order to preserve justice, peace, and internal tranquility).
224 Federalist 70 (Hamilton) at 471-72 (cited in note 8).
225 Id at 471.
226 Id at 472.
227 Id. See generally, Niccolb Machiavelli, The Prince and The Discourses (Carlton House
1900) (E.R.P Vincent, ed) (Luigi Ricci, trans).
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quire the approval of a council of state, would endanger virtues
needed for good government. Authority would be weakened, and con-
fusion among many opinions would reign, frustrating the govern-
ment's ability to respond to "the most critical emergencies of the
state.... A plural executive would "conceal faults, and destroy respon-
sibility," allowing blame for failure to be shifted and avoiding accoun-
tability of punishment by public opinion.9 A "cabal" within a council
would "enervate the whole system of administration" and produce
"habitual feebleness and dilatoriness." Hamilton pointed out, in-
sightfully, that the British constitution had established a council pre-
cisely in order to hold ministers responsible for mistakes, to maintain
the fiction that the king could do no wrong.3' Under a republican gov-
ernment, the buck should stop with the chief executive, who should
not be hampered with divided responsibility, nor free to deflect blame
onto a committee. "A council to a magistrate, who is himself responsi-
ble for what he does, are generally nothing better than a clog upon his
good intentions; are often the instruments and accomplices of his bad,
and are almost always a cloak to his faults."' 2
But it would be short-sighted to focus only on unity and indepen-
dence to the exclusion of one of Hamilton's other pillars-competent
powers. In beginning his discussion of the president's powers in Fede-
ralist 72, Hamilton observed that the "administration of government"
falls "peculiarly within the province of the executive department."23' It
included the conduct of foreign affairs, the preparation of the budget,
the expenditure of appropriated funds, the direction of the military,
and "the operations of war."' M Officers who exercised these powers
were assistants to the president who should be appointed by the ex-
ecutive and "be subject to his superintendence."'' Both, however, were
constructions that came from no specific grant of authority in the con-
stitutional text, only Article II's vesting of the general executive power
in the president.2
228 Federalist 70 (Hamilton) at 474 (cited in note 8).
229 Id at 476.
230 Id.
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Chief among the president's enumerated powers was law en-
forcement. "The execution of the laws and the employment of the
common strength, either for this purpose or for the common defense,
seem to comprise all the functions of the executive magistrate," Ham-
ilton observed. 7 The general grant of the executive power and the
duty to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed" both restrict
and empower the president.9 They make clear that the president can-
not suspend the law of the land at his whim, as British kings had, but
they also give the president authority both to enforce the law and to
interpret it. Enforcing the law gives the president the right to compel
the obedience of private individuals and even states to the Constitu-
tion, treaties, and acts of Congress'
Enforcement implies interpretation. In order to carry out the
laws, an executive must determine their meaning. Sometimes those
laws will be clear, as when the Constitution sets the minimum age for
a president.2" But more often than not, the laws are ambiguous or del-
egate decisionmaking to the executive. Judicial review usually arises
after a law's passage and enforcement, and it requires that a case be
brought. In situations where a law creates no private right to sue, or
the constitutional issue involves a political question immune from
judicial review, the courts may never even be able to take up a case
that raises the right question, effectively giving the executive or Con-
gress the final say."' With the current move to judicial supremacy and
the decline of the political question doctrine, however, the courts are
addressing more issues once in the hands of the political branches.22
Hamilton regarded the gravest threat to the separation of powers
to be the legislature's propensity "to intrude upon the rights and to
absorb the powers of the other departments.N 3 Skeptical of "a mere
parchment delineation of the boundaries," Hamilton believed instead
that each branch needed "constitutional arms for its own defence. ' 2"
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For the executive, that weapon is the veto. Today, presidents often veto
bills on policy grounds, needing the support of only thirty-four Sena-
tors to prevail. " More often than not, constitutional objections are left
to the courts. This is almost the reverse of the Framers' expectations.
In Federalist 73, Hamilton explained that the veto would allow the
president to deflect "an immediate attack upon the constitutional
rights of the executive."' 6 Blocking an act of Congress would have
been regarded as aggressive for courts at the time, but not for presi-
dents. Between 1789 and 1861, presidents vetoed roughly two dozen
bills for constitutional reasons; the Supreme Court struck down only
two." Jefferson even doubted whether he could veto a law for anything
but constitutional reasons."' Under this view, if a bill only made bad
policy, a president had no choice but to sign it. This problem did not
trouble Publius. The veto would not just serve as a "shield to the execu-
tive," but would "furnish[] an additional security against the enaction of
improper laws."2 9 For him, the president could veto laws because they
were too partisan, too hasty, or "unfriendly to the public good.''m
Some have argued that if a president believes a law is unconstitu-
tional, he has no choice but to veto it, and if his veto is overridden, he
has no choice but to carry out the law faithfully. 2 They cite the Consti-
tution's Take Care Clause as supportY. Textually, however, this argu-
ment ignores the fact that the Constitution is the highest law of the
land. The obligation to faithfully execute the laws requires the presi-
dent to obey the Constitution first above any statute to the contrary,
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as the Supreme Court recognized in Marbury v Madison2' 3-judicial
review flows from the principle that a court cannot enforce a law that
conflicts with the Constitution itself.2" To require the president to car-
ry out unconstitutional laws would defeat the larger purpose behind
the veto-to give the president the ability to balance the legislature.5
James Wilson, for one, anticipated that Congress might seek to grab
executive power: "the legislature may be restrained and kept within its
prescribed bounds by the interposition of the judicial department....
In the same manner the president of the United States could shield
himself and refuse to carry into effect an act that violates the Consti-
tution.' '.. As Akhil Amar has written, "In America, the bedrock prin-
ciple was not legislative supremacy but popular sovereignty."' " "The
higher law of the Constitution might sometimes allow, and in very
clear cases of congressional usurpation might even oblige," Amar ar-
gues, "a president to stand firm against a congressional statute in or-
der to defend the Constitution itself."2'
The veto power and the refusal to enforce unconstitutional laws
are aspects of executive control over law enforcement. Another is the
inherent discretion to prosecute some laws more vigorously than oth-
ers, which is a less confrontational, but equally significant, aspect of
the executive's discretion to allocate limited government resources in
accordance with its policy preferences. Presidents may decide to de-
vote few investigatory resources to enforce laws with which they dis-
agree, while transferring more to priorities on their agenda. The par-
don power enhances this discretion. A pardon is not subject to review
by any other branch; President Jefferson used the pardon to free per-
sons convicted of violating criminal laws that he regarded as unconsti-
tutional. 5, The pardon power was reinstated after several state consti-
tutions had removed it from the executive during the revolutionary
period. However, as Hamilton predicted and President Gerald Ford's
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pardon of President Richard Nixon proved, the main check on abuseS • 260
is public opinion.
At the time of the Constitution's framing, executive power was
understood to include the war, treaty, and other general foreign affairs
powers.26' Political theory developed by thinkers such as John Locke,
Baron de Montesquieu, and William Blackstone, as well as Anglo-
American constitutional history from the seventeenth century to the
time of the framing, established that foreign affairs was the province
261
of the executive branch of government. Under the British constitu-
tion, the Crown exercised the powers over war and peace, negotiation
and communication with foreign nations, and control of the military.
Parliament retained exclusive control over the purse, domestic regula-
tion, and raising the army and navy. When the colonies declared their
independence, these powers were assumed by the national govern-
ment under the Articles of Confederation -while the Continental
Congress served as the country's executive, it lacked any true legisla-
tive powers.65 Thus, when the Framers ratified the Constitution, they
would have understood that Article II, § 1 continued the Anglo-
American constitutional tradition of locating the foreign affairs power
generally in the executive branch.66
Hamilton and the other Federalists did not look to the executive
to manage war and peace for tradition's sake. They understood the
executive to be functionally best matched in speed, unity, and deci-
siveness to the unpredictable high-stakes nature of foreign affairs. As
Edward Corwin observed, the executive's advantages in foreign affairs
include: "[T]he unity of office, its capacity for secrecy and dispatch,
and its superior sources of information, to which should be added the
260 See Federalist 74 (Hamilton) at 501 (cited in note 6); Benton Becker, The History of the
Nixon Pardon, 30 Cumb L Rev 31,44 (1999).
261 See Yoo, The Powers of War and Peace at 31-32 (cited in note 148).
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bk 11, ch 6 at 151 (Hafner 1949) (Thomas Nugent, trans); William Blackstone, 1 Commentaries
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1985).
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fact that it is always on hand and ready for action, whereas the houses
of Congress are in adjournment much of the time.''
Threats to the national security led to greater centralization of
foreign affairs power in the executive. Article II gave the president the
roles of commander in chief and Chief Executive. "Of all the cares or
concerns of government, the direction of war most peculiarly demands
those qualities which distinguish the exercise of power by a single
hand," Hamilton wrote in Federalist 74. , "The direction of war im-
plies the direction of the common strength," he continued, "and the
power of directing and employing the common strength forms a usual
and essential part in the definition of the executive authority."0 It was
for this reason, Hamilton argued, that the Constitution vested execu-
tive authority in one person, rather than the multimember executives
of the Continental Congress and the states.Y' The executive's control,
however, was incomplete. Making treaties would remain executive in
nature - the power remained in Article II - but because of their status
as supreme federal law needed Senate consent." While the president
would control military operations and diplomatic relations, he would
not have the power to raise the military, issue the rules for its gover-
nance, nor enact any legislation with domestic effect. Appropriations
for the military could only run two years, giving Congress a regular
opportunity to review the executive's foreign policies.
73
B. Washington
A singular factor influenced the ratification of the Constitution,
and specifically Article II. All understood that George Washington
would be elected the first president." It is impossible to understate
the standing of the "Father of the Country" among his fellow Ameri-
cans."' He had led an outmanned and outgunned army to victory over
the world's leading military and economic power. ' He had established
America's fundamental constitutional principle-civilian control of
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the military-before there was even a constitution.m Throughout his
command of the Continental Army, General Washington scrupulously
observed civilian orders and restrained himself when a Congress, on
the run, granted him dictatorial powers 2 He had even put down, by
his mere presence, a potential coup d'etat by his officers in 1783.2
Washington cannot be quantified as an element of constitutional law,
but he was probably more important than any other factor.
The Revolutionary War had revealed Congress to be feeble and
the states to be unreliableY Washington had exercised broad execu-
tive and administrative authorities that went well beyond battlefield
command to keep the army supplied. ' This experience made Wash-
ington a firm nationalist who supported a more effectively organized
and vigorous national government.m Though he barely spoke at the
Constitutional Convention, Washington placed his considerable pres-
tige behind the enterprise.M3 During ratification, he launched a one-
man letter-writing campaign to encourage Federalists throughout the
country, and particularly in his critical home state of Virginia, to win
the Constitution's approval.m Washington remains the only president
to be elected by a unanimous vote of the Electoral College.-
Because the American republic grew so successfully, we tend to
treat Washington's decisions with an air of inevitability. But the consti-
tutional text left more questions about the executive unanswered than
answered. Article II vested the executive power of the United States
in a single president, but it did not list its components (unlike Ar-
ticle I's enumeration of legislative powers)."' It did not create any advi-
sors, heads of departments, or a cabinet, not to mention a White House
staff It did not specify how the president should interact with Congress,
the courts, or the states, nor describe how the president and the Senate
were to exercise their joint powers over treaties and appointments.
Washington filled these gaps with a number of foundational deci-
sions- several on a par with those made during the writing and ratifi-
cation of the Constitution itself. His desire to govern by consensus
277 Id at 35-47.
278 Id.
279 Id at 44-46.
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sometimes led him to seek cooperation with the other branches.8 He
was a republican before he was a Federalist, but ultimately Washing-
ton favored an energetic, independent executive, even at the cost of
political harmony. Washington centralized decisionmaking in his of-
fice, so that there would be no confusion about his responsibility and
accountability, and his direct orders sped quickly through the small fed-
eral bureaucracy. M He took the initiative in enforcing the law and fol-
lowed his own interpretation of the Constitution. To Washington, the
departments and their secretaries served only as "dependent agencies
of the Chief Executive."" As Leonard White has written, the president
made "all major decisions of administration" and took full responsibili-
ty for them.29 He managed diplomatic relations with other countries
and set the nation's foreign policy.9' At the end of his two terms, the
Presidency looked much like the one described in The Federalist Papers.
This was no mistake. Hamilton's outsized performance as Secretary of
the Treasury helped, but the real credit goes to Washington.
None of this was foreordained. Washington could have chosen to
mimic a parliamentary system with cabinet secretaries who
represented different factions in the legislature or a balanced govern-
ment with executive branch officials drawn from an aristocratic social
class. He could have assumed the function of a head of state and giv-
en department secretaries freedom over their jurisdictions. Or he
could have considered the Presidency as Congress's clerk, draining
any initiative from the job and committing himself solely to carrying
out legislative directions. He might even have thought of himself as
the servant of the states. A different man might have considered the
Constitution an evolution from the Articles of Confederation, with the
Congress continuing to exercise the nation's full sovereignty.
Calabresi and Yoo, and judges and scholars since, have rightly fo-
cused on the "Decision of 1789" as an important event in the Washing-
ton administration (p 42). But congressional recognition of the execu-
tive right to remove cabinet secretaries, while important to constitu-
tional lawyers, was not necessarily as critical to Washington's success
as his exercise of the Presidency's substantive powers. Indeed, it is not
clear whether Washington himself considered the recognition of his
297 Phelps, George Washington andnAmerican Constitutionalism at 167-69 (cited in note 142).
288 Id at 145-46.
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removal authority over the Secretaries of Treasury and State to be
significant, nor was there any articulation by the administration of its
vision of the president's constitutional powers. As Calabresi and Yoo
note, Washington moved to assert direct control over the administra-
tion of government even before Congress established the first great
departments (pp 43-50).
Instead, Washington's great achievement was keeping the young
nation out of the wars triggered by the French Revolution. Washing-
ton set the precedent that the executive branch would assume the
leading role in developing and carrying out foreign policy. But he did
not go unchallenged. In defending Washington's foreign policy initia-
tives, Hamilton first publicly argued that the president is vested with
all of the government's executive power, except that specifically trans-
ferred to another branch by a constitutional provision.29 Presidents
ever since have taken the initiative in foreign affairs by relying on
their constitutional powers.2"
The beginning of the French Revolution in 1789 set off wars in
Europe that would last a quarter century. Eventually, the United
States became entangled and barely escaped with its independence
intact.9 But Washington kept the United States out of the conflict,
giving the nation time to develop its strength and confidence.2  In
guiding the young republic between the Scylla and Charybdis of Brit-
ain and France, he imposed a policy of neutrality based on the consti-
tutional understanding that he held the authority to set foreign policy,
interpret and even terminate treaties, and decide the nation's interna-
tional obligations.m Washington paid a steep price: his policies divided
his government, sparked the creation of the first political party, and
turned future presidential elections into partisan affairs.m
After the beheading of King Louis XVI, France declared war on
Great Britain and Holland on February 1, 1793.' Edmund Genet, the
294 See Hamilton, Pacificus No 1 at 33-43 (cited in note 11).
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new regime's ambassador to the United States, arrived two months
later.3' News of war threw the American government into a quandary
over the 1778 treaties with France, which had been crucial to the suc-
cess of the Revolution.3 Article 11 of the Treaty of Alliance called on
the United States to guarantee French possessions in the Americas,
which implied that the United States might have to defend France's
West Indies colony (today's Haiti). Article 17 of the companion 1778
commercial treaty gave French warships and privateers the right to
bring captured enemy ships as prizes into American ports. Article 22
prohibited the United States from allowing France's enemies to equip
or launch privateers or sell prizes in American ports.3
Genet attempted to rouse the American people against Britain.
Demanding that the United States honor the treaties, he authorized
American ships to raid British shipping.6 The cabinet split over a re-
sponse. Jefferson deeply hated Great Britain, admired the French
Revolution, and suspected Hamilton of plotting to duplicate the Brit-
ish political system.3 For his part, Hamilton loathed the French Revo-
lution, and his financial system depended on good relations with Brit-
ain.3 Upon learning of the French declaration of war, Hamilton,
"[w]ith characteristic boldness" immediately urged Washington to
suspend or terminate the treaties.m' Hamilton believed that Britain's
control of the seas and its trading system made good relations with
London paramount. ' While a change in government did not automat-
ically void treaties with another state, he argued that the uncertain
status of the French government and the dangerous wartime situation
allowed suspension of the treaties. While Jefferson agreed that mili-
tary participation in the European war was out of the question, he
These events are also discussed in David P Currie, The Constitution in Congress: The Third Con-
gress, 1793-1795,63 U Chi L Rev 1, 4-16 (1996).
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believed the United States was obliged to fulfill the treaties (under-the
Articles of Confederation he had served as minister to France). 2
On April 18, Washington sent a list of thirteen questions to Ham-
ilton, Jefferson, Knox, and Edmund Randolph313 and ordered a cabinet
meeting for the next day -establishing a regular mechanism of presi-
dential decisionmaking. 3' Almost all of Washington's questions in-
volved the interpretation of the 1778 treaties. Question four, for ex-
ample, asked: "Are the United States obliged by good faith to consider
the Treaties heretofore made with France as applying to the present
situation of the parties? 31 1 Washington ordered them to give an opi-
nion on whether Article 11 applied to an offensive war launched by
France, whether the United States could both observe the treaties and
remain neutral, and under what conditions the United States could
suspend or terminate the treaties.
Washington's questions produced a deceptive unanimity in the
cabinet. Everyone agreed that a proclamation of neutrality should be
issued, but in order to assuage Jefferson's concerns, the word "neutral-
ity" was not used.1 Indeed, given the United States' distance, its mili-
tary weakness, and its strategic irrelevance to the European theatre,
neutrality was the only realistic option. Two other questions received
the same unanimity. The cabinet agreed that the president should re-
ceive Genet as France's ambassador, making the United States the
first nation to recognize the government of revolutionary France318
The cabinet members further agreed that consulting Congress was
unnecessary. 9 The executive branch would decide the nation's posi-
tion on the European wars. Adjourning the meeting without reaching
the other questions, Washington asked his advisers to submit written
responses on whether to suspend or terminate the 1778 treaties.
No one in the cabinet disputed that the President held this power
under the Constitution. On April 28, 1793, Jefferson, later joined by
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Randolph, argued that international law did not permit the suspension
or annulling of a treaty because of a change in government."' Because
Jefferson believed that France was unlikely to ask the United States to
defend the West Indies, he recommended that the administration do
nothing.32 2 On May 2, Hamilton and Knox argued that the civil war in
France allowed the United States to suspend the treaty or even termi-
nate it because of the new circumstances threatening American nation-
al security.32 They read the treaty to apply only to defensive wars, not to
one in which France had attacked first.32' Telling Jefferson that he "never
had a doubt about the validity of the treaty," Washington decided
against suspension the next day.3 On the question of the West Indies,
Washington decided to remain silent, a wise choice, as Jefferson's pre-
diction proved correct and France did not seek American aid."'
Washington issued his decision in a proclamation.3 Recognizing a
state of war between France and the other European powers, he an-
nounced that the United States "should with sincerity and good faith
adopt and pursue a conduct friendly and impartial toward the bellige-
rent powers."3 Washington further saw fit to "declare the disposition
of the United States to observe the conduct aforesaid towards those
Powers respectfully" and "to exhort and warn the citizens of the Unit-
ed States carefully to avoid all acts and proceedings whatsoever which
may in any manner tend to contravene such disposition.329 The proc-
lamation also stated that the federal government would prosecute
those who "violate the law of nations, with respect to the powers at
war. ' , 3 His proclamation was a determination that American obliga-
tions did not require entry into the war on the side of the French. Af-
ter a year, Congress implemented his interpretation into domestic law
by making it a crime for a citizen to violate American neutrality.3 '
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Although the Continental Congress had negotiated and ratified
the 1778 treaties, Washington never asked about its intentions.32 None
of his cabinet members wanted to interpret the treaties in the light
most favorable to France. Both Hamilton and Jefferson grounded
their appeals in the national interest, international law, and common
sense."' Neither expressed a belief that consultation with Congress or
the Senate was necessary or advisable."' Washington and his cabinet
proceeded on the assumption that it was the province of the executive
branch to interpret treaties, and so set foreign policy, on behalf of the
United States. They even believed that the president had the authority
to terminate the 1778 treaties.33' Even though Hamilton convinced
Washington to declare neutrality, it is doubtful that Jefferson could have
produced any other outcome-the United States simply was not going
to enter the war on France's side, at least not for another two decades.
The proclamation provoked one of the great constitutional de-
bates in American history. It is important to recognize that this first
great constitutional argument over the president's powers did not nar-
rowly address the president's removal power, but instead turned on
the president's substantive executive authority. In a series of newspa-
per articles that summer, Hamilton adopted the pseudonym of "Paci-
ficus" to defend the president's constitutional authority.3 7 Hamilton
began with the position that foreign policy was executive by its very
138
nature. Congress was not the "organ of intercourse" with foreign
nations, while the judiciary could only "decide litigations in particular
cases. ,3 9 Declaring neutrality, therefore, must "of necessity belong to
the Executive."' It drew from the executive's authority as "the organ
of intercourse between the Nation and foreign Nations," as "interpre-
ter of the National Treaties in those cases in which the Judiciary is not
competent," and as enforcer of the law, "of which treaties form a
part."'4' Hamilton argued that treaties, as well as the rules of interna-
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tional law, were part of the laws to be carried out by the executive, 2
and "[h]e who is to execute the laws must first judge for himself of
their meaning.. Last, but not least, Hamilton believed the Executive
could declare neutrality because of its "[p]ower which is charged with
the command and application of the Public Force."
Hamilton argued that the president's authority derived from Ar-
ticle II, § 2's grant of the executive power 4 ' The Constitution already
made the president commander in chief, maker of treaties with the
advice and consent of the Senate, receiver of ambassadors, and execu-
tor of the laws.4' But "[i]t would not consist with rules of sound con-
struction to consider this enumeration of particular authorities as de-
rogating from the more comprehensive grant contained in the general
clause. ' ' ' Article II's enumeration of powers "ought ... to be consi-
dered as intended ... to specify and regulate the principal articles im-
plied in the definition of Executive Power; leaving the rest to flow
from the general grant of that power."' For Hamilton, the Senate's
role in making treaties was only a narrow exception from the general
grant of executive power to the president, and "ought to be construed
strictly."'' 9 When the Constitution sought to transfer traditionally ex-
ecutive powers away from the president, it did so specifically, as with
the power to declare war."O "The general doctrine then of our constitu-
tion is, that the Executive Power of the Nation is vested in the Presi-
dent," Hamilton concluded, "subject only to the exceptions and
qu[a]lifications which are expressed in that instrument.35.
Madison, however, expressed surprise and concern over the presi-
dent's Declaration of Neutrality. In a letter to Jefferson, Madison
claimed Hamilton had talked Washington into an "assumption of pre-
rogatives not clearly found in the Constitution and having the appear-
ance of being copied from a Monarchical model. 3.2 His immediate criti-
cism was that the declaration represented an intrusion on Congress's
342 Id at 43.
343 Id.
3" Id at 38.
345 Hamilton, Pacificus No I at 38-39 (cited in note 11).
346 Id.
347 Id at 39.
348 Id.
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351 Id at 39.
352 James Madison, Letter from Madison to Jefferson (June 13, 1793), in Catanzariti, ed, 26
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power to declare war."' Jefferson explained that although he had agreed
in the cabinet that the president could declare neutrality without con-
sulting Congress, he nonetheless held constitutional concerns.3 When
Hamilton's Pacificus essays-defending the president's power to dec-
lare neutrality -appeared in the press, Jefferson begged Madison: "For
god's sake, my dear Sir, take up your pen, select the most striking here-
sies and cut him to p[ie]ces in the face of the public."''
Under the pseudonym "Helvidius," Madison took issue with
every point of Hamilton's constitutional arguments. He dismissed
Locke's and Montesquieu's classification of foreign affairs as execu-
tive in nature because they were "evidently warped by a regard to the
particular government of England. 3 7 Making treaties and declaring
war were legislative powers because they had the force of law; there-
fore, the president could not exercise them. "The natural province of
the executive magistrate is to execute laws, as that of the legislature is
to make laws," Madison wrote... "All his acts therefore, properly ex-
ecutive, must presuppose the existence of the laws to be executed."
' '0
The Constitution vested the power to declare war in Congress and
gave the Senate an equal share in the treaty power. The legislature
sets private rules of conduct that become the law of the land via the
Supremacy Clause 6' To allow the president a share of the legislative
power "is an absurdity -in practice a tyranny.''
Madison's deeper argument was that placing the power to both
start and wage war in the same hands risked tyranny. "Those who are
to conduct a war cannot in the nature of things, be proper or safe
judges, whether a war ought to be commenced, continued, or con-
cluded."' ' Why? Because, according to Madison, "[w]ar is in fact the
true nurse of executive aggrandizement."4 In war, "physical force is to
be created," "the public treasures are to be unlocked," "the honors
353 Id.
354 See Jefferson, Letter to James Madison at 346 (cited in note 317).
355 Jefferson, Jefferson to Madison (July 7, 1793), in Catanzariti, ed, 26 Papers of Thomas
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and emoluments of office are to be multiplied," "laurels are to be ga-
thered," and all are to be placed at the disposal of the executive.35 It is
an "axiom," therefore, that "the executive is the department of power
most distinguished by its propensity to war."'" Pacificus's broad read-
ing of the vesting of the executive power in the president, Madison
retorted, was nothing less than an effort to smuggle the British Crown
into the Constitution.367
History has looked more favorably on Hamilton's arguments.
Helvidius claimed rather unpersuasively that foreign affairs were leg-
islative in nature or shared between the branches, and he never direct-
ly addressed Hamilton's argument about the vesting of the executive
power in the president.6 It was difficult for Madison to deny that Ar-
ticle II granted the president some unenumerated powers, in light of
his arguments during the removal debate.'" Madison ultimately rested
on the narrower point that the president could not interpret treaties in
a manner that prevented Congress from exercising its own plenary
constitutional power to declare war.370 The proclamation, however, did
not prevent Congress from declaring war. Washington's actions only
had the effect of preserving the status quo.
Despite the partisan divisions, the Helvidius-Pacificus debates
and the neutrality controversy demonstrate some common ground. No
one doubted that the president held the initiative in foreign policy; nor
did Madison take serious issue with the idea that the executive had
the power to interpret or even terminate treaties. Madison and Jeffer-
son were making a broader argument against unenumerated executive
powers and the structural point that those powers could not be used
to supplant Congress's own authorities. Hamilton agreed with this up
to a point, noting that Congress's power to declare war gave it the fi-
nal word on whether the United States was in a state of war with
another country. 3 The Constitution's explicit grant of a specific power
to Congress prevents the president from usurping that power, just as
Congress cannot use its own plenary powers to invade the proper
365 Id.
366 Id at 109.
367 Madison, Helvidius No 1 at 72 (cited in note 356).
368 See Elkins and McKitrick, Age of Federalism at 362 (cited in note 121) (noting Madi-
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scope of the executive. We can see this balance in Washington's un-
successful efforts to prosecute individuals for violating the proclama-
tion.73 Only Congress could regulate the conduct of citizens within the
United States, and it was not until Congress enacted criminal legisla-
tion that prosecutions could succeed.7
The proclamation set one of the most important precedents for
executive power. Presidents henceforth would exercise the initiative in
foreign affairs. The growth of the nation and its interests would place
increasing pressure on Jefferson's and Madison's constitutional vision.
As the effect of foreign affairs on the nation grew, the powers of the
office would keep pace. Still, Hamilton's view required no prerogative,
no ability of the president to act outside of the Constitution when ne-
cessity demanded. He believed that the Constitution gave the presi-
dent, through the grant of "the executive power" of the government,
all of the authority necessary to handle exigencies and unforeseen
circumstances. 7' Jefferson and Madison, on the other hand, fought
against an elastic reading of presidential power. This would force
them, surprisingly, into the position of relying on the theory of an ex-
tra-constitutional presidential prerogative when they assumed power
in 1800. In this fundamental debate over the nature of the executive,
the removal and control of subordinate officials would have been a
corollary, if not an afterthought, to the greater question of the scope of
the president's substantive authority.
C. Jefferson
Jefferson is widely thought to have opposed a strong Presidency.
While envoy to France, he faulted the proposed Constitution because
it contained no presidential term limits. He worried that once
elected, a president would be returned to office for life. "I am not a
friend to a very energetic government. It is always oppressive," he ex-
372 See text accompanying note 210.
373 See Stewart Jay, Origins of Federal Common Law: Part One, 133 U Pa L Rev 1003,1048-
53 (1985).
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plained to Madison" He praised the Constitution because it created
"one effectual check to the Dog of war by transferring the power of
letting him loose from the Executive to the Legislative body. '3n While
Secretary of State, Jefferson adopted a theory of strict construction to
oppose Hamilton's broad interpretation of the Constitution's implied
powers-first with the creation of the national bank, then with the
proclamation of neutrality-and he organized America's first political
party to oppose the "monocrats" who were allegedly reinstalling fea-
tures of the British monarchy in the United States. 37 Jefferson charac-
terized his election "as real a revolution in the principles of our gov-
ernment as that of 1776 was in its form," by saving the country from a
Federalist Party that favored the executive.3"
In office, however, Jefferson claimed the right to interpret the
laws at odds with the courts and Congress, bought Louisiana even
while doubting the act's constitutionality, shepherded legislation
through Congress, and tied the legitimacy of the Presidency to the will
of the majority.3' His actions belie the straw man of a weak Jefferso-
nian Presidency, a fact not lost on his contemporaries. Hamilton said
that during their time in the Washington administration, Jefferson
''was generally for a large construction of the Executive authority"
and was "not backward to act upon it in cases which coincided with his
views. ''3 This was Hamilton's idea of a compliment. Henry Adams
would conclude in his magisterial history on Jefferson and Madison
that the former exercised presidential power more completely than
had ever before been known in American history Many political
scientists ever since have considered Jefferson's actions as an example
of principle giving way before the needs of political expediency. 3
A growing minority of historians and political scientists, including
Jeremy Bailey, Ralph Ketcham, David Mayer, and Gary Schmitt, ar-
377 Id at 442.
378 Thomas Jefferson, Jefferson to James Madison (Sept 6, 1789), in Julian P. Boyd, ed, 15
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gues that this contradiction proceeds from a false starting point.. It is
assumed that Jefferson favored a weak executive because he sought a
limited national government. The two ideas, however, need not con-
flict. Jefferson indeed wanted a government of limited constitutional
powers balanced by states possessing significant sovereignty. In his
draft of the 1798 Kentucky Resolutions, Jefferson argued that the Un-
ion represented only a compact between the states, rather than a na-
tional government representing one people." But within that frame-
work, he favored a clean separation of powers that made each branch
of government supreme in its own sphere. For those matters properly
classified as executive in nature, the president would govern, subject
to the explicit exceptions and power sharing set out in the Constitu-
tion.W He favored a Presidency headed by one individual, free of a
council of advisors, to enhance executive accountability and responsi-
bility, and sought to reconceptualize the office as the representative of
a popular majority, elected to carry out an agenda.m Jefferson em-
barked on a major innovation in presidential power, that of the presi-
dent as party leader, which allowed him to promote a national pro-
gram by coordinating the activities of the executive and legislative
branches.- ' Jefferson made the Presidency more powerful by making it
more popular. °
Jefferson profoundly affected the Presidency by introducing the
concept of the prerogative. He advanced the theory, clearly following
Locke, that the president could act outside the Constitution to protect
the national interest in moments of great crisis or opportunity. 9' In
this, he differed from Hamilton and the Federalists, who believed that
the formal powers of the president were flexible enough to address
any national emergency. Jefferson followed a strict-constructionist
385 Jeremy D. Bailey, Thomas Jefferson and Executive Power 3-4 (Cambridge 2007).
386 See Thomas Jefferson, Drafts of the Kentucky Resolutions of 1798 (Nov 17,1798), in Paul
L. Ford, ed, 8 The Works of Thomas Jefferson 458,458-60 (Knickerbocker 1904).
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389 See id at 13.
390 See Ralph Ketcham, Presidents above Party: The First American Presidency, 1789-1829
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approach to interpreting the Constitution, which resisted a broad
reading of the president's formal powers.' The prerogative allowed
Jefferson to protect the country in unforeseen circumstances and keep
his constitutional principles. As in the Louisiana Purchase, he could
act beyond the Constitution when necessity demanded it.'" In ex-
change, the president had to throw himself upon the people for ap-
proval of his unconstitutional act. That check reinforced Jefferson's
innovation of placing the legitimacy of the Presidency on national
election and his representation of the will of the majority.9'
While it was not the product of luck, the Louisiana Purchase must
have seemed like the intervention of Fortune. When American minis-
ters arrived in Paris to negotiate for control of New Orleans, they re-
ceived a gift. Napoleon decided to sell not just New Orleans, but the
entire Louisiana territory.'" The American envoys quickly decided to
exceed their instructions and buy all of Louisiana for about $15 mil-
lion. 9 The Louisiana Purchase was an undoubted success for the
United States and for Jefferson. It doubled the size of the United
States, gave it permanent control of the Mississippi and New Orleans,
and dislodged France and Spain as serious threats to American na-
tional security in the West'9
But in order to buy Louisiana, Jefferson had to change his vision
of the Constitution. Jefferson had believed that the Constitution did
not permit the acquisition of new territory or the incorporation of
such territory into the Union as new states. The Constitution has no
express provision providing for the addition of territory, though Ar-
ticle IV, § 3 gives Congress the power to "dispose of and make all
needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Prop-
erty belonging to the United States.""' Some later argued that this
clause assumes that new property could be added in the future, but as
Gary Lawson and Guy Seidman have pointed out, this interpretation
runs counter to the text of the clause and its placement in the Constitu-
392 Schmitt, Thomas Jefferson at 342 (cited in note 390) ("When an instrument admits two
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tion.4w The clause describes the power to make rules and dispose of
property, but it does not empower the government to add new territory
in the first place-it could be read to apply only to the territory of the
United States as it existed in 1789, such as the Northwest Territory."
Jefferson also doubted whether new territory could become
states. ' The Constitution provides for the addition of new states, upon
the approval of Congress, and it prohibits the formation of new states
out of the borders of existing states without their consent.4 Jefferson
apparently worried that this prohibition also applied to the creation of
new states from the territory of existing states. His Attorney General,
Levi Lincoln, agreed and advised that the boundaries of existing states
be enlarged to include the Louisiana Purchase."4
Jefferson and his cabinet sought refuge in a position that was
"virtually indistinguishable" from Hamilton's arguments in the de-
bates over the Neutrality Proclamation and the Jay Treaty. , Treasury
Secretary Albert Gallatin argued in a cabinet meeting that the United
States could use the treaty power to exercise a sovereign power be-
longing to all nations, such as the inherent right to acquire territory,
and that Congress could admit the acquisition as a state or govern it as
a territory.4' This broad reading of the executive power allows the pres-
ident and Senate together to exercise power that is nowhere set out in
the Constitution but must be deduced by examining the rights of other
nations in their international affairs. This power would redound to the
benefit of the president, the primary force in treatymaking.
Jefferson accepted Gallatin's reasoning, though he predicted that
new territory would enter the Union as a matter of "expediency" ra-
ther than constitutional principle.*' To John Dickinson, Jefferson ad-
mitted in August 1803: "Our confederation is certainly confined to the
limits established by the revolution. The general government has no
powers but such as the constitution has given it; and it has not given it
a power of holding foreign territory, & still less of incorporating it into
400 Lawson and Seidman, The Constitution of Empire at 28-29 (cited in note 398).
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the Union. '' .. He confessed that "[a]n amendment of the Constitution
seems necessary for this."9 Jefferson did not limit himself to private
letters to friends, but expressed his views to his close ally in the Senate,
John Breckinridge of Kentucky. "The Executive in seizing the fugitive
occurrence which so much advances the good of their country, have
done an act beyond the Constitution," Jefferson wrote in August."O It
was now up to Congress to support the unconstitutional act. "The Leg-
islature in casting behind them metaphysical subtleties, and risking
themselves like faithful servants, must ratify & pay for it, and throw
themselves on their country for doing for them unauthorized what we
know they would have done for themselves had they been in a situa-
tion to do it...1. Jefferson believed it was best to admit openly the vi-
olation of the Constitution and seek popular support, which he be-
lieved was healthier for the constitutional system. "We shall not be
disavowed by the nation," he predicted, "and their act of indemnity
will confirm and not weaken the Constitution, by more strongly mark-
ing out its lines....2
Jefferson even personally drafted at least two constitutional
amendments adding Louisiana,"3 but events forced him from the luxury
of his strict constructionist beliefs." Shortly after he wrote to Dickinson
and Breckinridge, Jefferson received a dispatch from Robert Livingston
in Paris that Napoleon was having seller's remorse. ' Livingston re-
ported that Napoleon would seize any delay or request for changes as
an opportunity to renounce the agreement.' Jefferson worried that the
delay of a constitutional amendment would give France the opening it
needed, though both Madison and Gallatin thought France would not
back out (no one in the cabinet thought a constitutional amendment
was necessary either). 7 Jefferson sent letters to Congress asking that
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constitutional objections to the treaty be dropped, and that "nothing
must be said on that subject which may give a pretext for retracting; but
that we should do sub-silentio what shall be found necessary.
'1 8
Jefferson's most remarkable exchange came with Senator Wilson
Cary Nicholas. Nicholas warned that any public statement by Jeffer-
son against the constitutionality of the Purchase might sink the treaty
in the Senate."'9 Jefferson agreed that "whatever Congress shall think it
necessary to do, should be done with as little debate as possible, &
particularly so far as respects the constitutional difficulty..... Still he
could not resist the opportunity to restate his belief that the Constitu-
tion did not envision the addition of new states from territory not al-
ready part of the nation in 1789. The opposite construction, advanced
by his cabinet and by Nicholas, too, would allow the United States to
add "England, Ireland, Holland, &c into it."''2' Broad rules of interpreta-
tion, Jefferson warned, would "make our powers boundless" and would
render the Constitution "a blank paper by construction."' 22 Jefferson
claimed that when faced with a choice between two readings of the
Constitution, "the one safe, the other dangerous, the one precise, the
other indefinite," he would choose the "safe & precise" and instead "ask
an enlargement of power from the nation where it is found necessary."''
Jefferson had claimed an authority for the president to act out-
side the Constitution itself when circumstances demanded it. If he had
interpreted the powers of the executive narrowly, he would have put
the Louisiana Purchase in danger. But it was Jefferson's strict con-
structionist views that created this dilemma in the first place. His read-
ing of the Constitution seems mistaken and has never been the view
of any of the three branches of government since.4 Article IV, § 3
gives Congress the authority to admit new states, and then adds the
qualifier that when new states are formed from existing states, those
states must consent.25 The broader power, without that qualification,
must apply to something (otherwise, why not just make all admissions
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subject to state consent), and that something must be the creation of
states out of new territory. As Lawson and Seidman argue, the Admis-
sions Clause, as it is known, merely declares that "new states may be
admitted by the Congress into this Union. '' 6
Instead, Jefferson read the executive power to include the author-
ity to acquire the Louisiana Territory because of the threat to the na-
tional security if it had remained in the hands of other nations. He
took advantage of this great national opportunity, even to the point of
adopting a vision of presidential powers potentially broader, in some
ways, than that of Hamilton. Washington had established the legitima-
cy of the national government by keeping his energetic executive
within its constitutional bounds. ' Hamilton had given theoretical
punch to Washington's actions by arguing that the Constitution had to
include the power to address every national emergency, and that this
power would naturally reside in the executive. ' Jefferson, however,
approached the Presidency more in keeping with Locke's theory of
the prerogative. In his letter to Breckinridge, Jefferson had bypassed
constitutional objections to the Louisiana Purchase by comparing his
position to that of a guardian who acts beyond his authority but in the
best interests of his ward. ' He had to seize the opportunity "which so
much advances the good of the country.. 3. Jefferson claimed that un-
foreseen circumstances, produced either by necessity or by opportuni-
ty, required him to exceed his legal powers to protect the greater
good."' Following Locke, Jefferson looked for ratification for his ultra
vires decisions-"an indemnity," as he wrote to Breckinridge - from
the people through their representatives in Congress.
4 32
Several difficulties emerge from Jefferson's adoption of Locke's
theory of the executive prerogative. He did not explain when the na-
tion's security is truly at stake-when it triggers the prerogative and
when it does not. Jefferson admitted that it would sometimes prove
difficult to identify the line between acting within the law and invok-
ing the prerogative. " He compared the judgment needed to that of a
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good officer who knew when to act as he thought best because his
orders did not anticipate an unforeseen case or extreme results.'3, Jef-
ferson did not limit the executive's prerogative to just self-defense; he
also approved actively seizing opportunity to advance the nation's
interests. He believed that a president could act decisively, even with-
out congressional approval, to acquire foreign territory like Louisiana.
Any check would come from popular approval of his actions, though
Jefferson left unclear whether it would be expressed in public opinion,
congressional response, or the next national elections.
D. Lincoln
No one stands higher in our nation's pantheon than Abraham
Lincoln. Washington founded the nation. Lincoln saved it. Without
him, the United States might have lost eleven of its thirty-six states,
and ten of its thirty million people. Building on Jackson's arguments
against nullification, he interpreted the Constitution as serving a sin-
gle nation, rather than existing to protect slavery. 35 The Civil War
transformed the United States from a plural word into a singular
noun. That nation no longer withheld citizenship because of race. It
guaranteed to all men the right to vote and to the equal protection of
the laws. Where once the Constitution was seen as a limit on effective
government, Lincoln transformed it into a charter that empowered
popular democracy.
Part of Lincoln's greatness stems from the tragic choices that con-
fronted him. As he famously wrote in 1864, "I claim not to have con-
trolled events, but confess plainly that events have controlled me.''
He did not seek the war, but understood that there were worse things
than war. Victory over the South came at an enormous cost to the na-
tion. About 600,000 Americans lost their lives out of a population of
31 million-about equal to American battle deaths in all other wars
combined. '37 One-quarter of the South's white male population of mili-
tary age were killed or injured.' While the total value of Northern
wealth rose 50 percent during the 1860s, Southern wealth declined by
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60 percent. '39 The human cost weighed heavily upon Lincoln, but it was
necessary to atone for the wrong of slavery. "Fondly do we hope, fer-
vently do we pray, that this mighty scourge of war may speedily pass
away," Lincoln wrote in his Second Inaugural Address." ° "Yet, if God
wills that it continue until all the wealth piled by the bondsman's two
hundred and fifty years of unrequited toil shall be sunk, and until
every drop of blood drawn with the lash shall be paid by another
drawn with the sword," he continued, "as was said three thousand
years ago, so still it must be said 'the judgments of the Lord are true
and righteous altogether."'"'1 One ol the lives lost would be Lin-
coln's-the first president to be assassinated.
Lincoln's greatness is inextricably linked to his broad vision of
presidential power. He invoked his authority as commander in chief
and Chief Executive to conduct war, initially without congressional
permission," ' when many were unsure whether secession meant war.
He considered the entire South the field of battle, and read his powers
to counter anything that helped the Confederate war effort. While he
depended on congressional support for the men and material to win
the conflict, Lincoln made critical decisions on tactics, strategy, and
policy without input from the legislature. The most controversial was
the Emancipation Proclamation. "3 Only Lincoln's broad interpretation
of his commander-in-chief authority made that sweeping step of free-
ing the slaves possible."
Some have argued that part of Lincoln's tragedy is that he had to
exercise unconstitutional powers in order to save the Union. In their
classic studies of the Presidency, Arthur M. Schlesinger called Lincoln
a "despot," and both Edward Corwin and Clinton Rossiter considered
Lincoln to have assumed a "dictatorship.""' These views echo argu-
ments made during the Civil War itself, even by Republicans who be-
lieved that the Constitution could not address such an unprecedented
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conflict." Lincoln surely claimed that he could draw on power beyond
the Constitution in order to preserve the nation. As he wrote to a
Kentucky newspaper editor in 1864, "Was it possible to lose the na-
tion, and yet preserve the constitution?""' To Lincoln, common sense
supplied the answer: "By general law life and limb must be protected;
yet often a limb must be amputated to save a life; but a life is never
wisely given to save a limb."48 Necessity could justify unconstitutional
acts. "I felt that measures, otherwise unconstitutional, might become
lawful, by becoming indispensable to the preservation of the constitu-
tion, through the preservation of the nation.""9 Lincoln's simple, yet
powerful invocation of a prerogative power to protect the nation owes
an intellectual debt to Jefferson and Locke.4
Lincoln, however, was no dictator. While he used his powers more
broadly than any previous president, he was responding to a crisis that
threatened the very life of the nation. He flirted with the idea of a
Lockean prerogative, but his actions drew upon the same mix of ex-
ecutive powers that had supported Washington, Jefferson, and Jack-
son. He relied on his power as commander in chief to give him control
over decisions ranging from tactics and strategy to reconstruction pol-
icy. Like his predecessors, Lincoln interpreted his constitutional duty
to execute the laws, his role as Chief Executive, and his presidential
oath as grants of power to use force, if necessary, against those who
opposed the authority of the United States. Lincoln understood "my
oath to preserve the constitution to the best of my ability, imposed
upon me the duty of preserving, by every indispensable means, that
government-that nation-of which that constitution was the organic
law. 4 11 It seems clear that Lincoln believed that the Constitution
vested him with sufficient authority to handle secession and Civil War
without the need to resort to Jefferson's prerogative.
Lincoln refused to believe that the Constitution withheld the
power for its own self-preservation. 4" Rather than seek a greater pow-
er outside the law to protect the nation, he found it in the Chief Ex-
ecutive Clause . That gave Lincoln the authority to decide that seces-
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sion justified military coercion, and the wide range of measures he
took in response: raising an army, invasion and blockade of the South,
military government of captured territory, suspension of the writ of
habeas corpus, and tough internal security measures.' Lincoln consis-
tently maintained that he had not sought prerogative powers, but that
the Constitution gave him unique war powers to respond to the threat
to the nation's security.'" Lincoln's political rhetoric invoked Jefferson,
but his constitutional logic followed Hamilton.
One of Lincoln's most remarkable exercises of presidential au-
thority often goes unremarked. His decision that secession was un-
constitutional and that the Union could oppose it by force was fun-
damental to the beginning of the Civil War." Today, most accept Lin-
coln's view, but they forget that the Constitution does not explicitly
address the question, nor does it spell out who has the right to decide
it. As Daniel Farber pointed out in his book, Lincoln's Constitution,
one need only contrast Lincoln's approach to that of his predecessor,
James Buchanan..4 " Buchanan believed that secession was illegal but
that he lacked the constitutional authority to stop it.'" In the waning
days of his administration, his attorney general concluded that the
executive only had authority to defend federal property, and that he
could not call in the militia to enforce federal law because no federal
law enforcement officials remained in the South. '59 The Constitution
gave neither the president nor Congress, the attorney general's opi-
nion reasoned, the power to "make war" against the seceding states to
restore the Union. ° In his December 1860 annual message to Con-
gress, Buchanan blamed the crisis on Northern agitation to overturn
slavery.46' Even though the South could not secede, he could not "make
war against a State," leaving the federal government powerless.,u After
the rest of the Deep South seceded and formed the Confederate
States of America, Buchanan again declared that the executive power
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did not include the use of force against a state, and humbly requested
that Congress, "the only human tribunal under Providence possessing
the power to meet the existing emergency," do something.' 3
Lincoln understood that the Constitution empowered him to do
much more than issue a polite invitation that the South return home.
The Confederate States were frustrating the constitutional system and
denying the results of nationwide democratic elections. They had se-
ceded against a national government that had yet to pass any law pro-
hibiting slavery in the territories or the South itself. In his First Inau-
gural Address, Lincoln promised not to interfere with the bargain
reached in the Constitution that the Southern states could decide on
slavery as a matter of their own "domestic institutions.Y 1 He con-
strued his constitutional duty to execute the law to require him to en-
force the Fugitive Slave Clause and to refrain from any interference
"with the institution of slavery in the States where it exists."'46
Secession, however, was an unconstitutional response to his elec-
tion. Echoing Jackson, Lincoln declared that the Union, as a nation,
was perpetual.i It preexisted the Constitution; it preexisted the Ar-
ticles of Confederation.4" Even the Constitution recognized this fact
by providing, in its Preamble, for a more perfect Union." Because
secession was illegal, Lincoln reasoned, the Southern states were still
part of the nation and "the Union [was] unbroken.""' Resistance to
federal law and institutions was the work not of the states themselves,
but of a conspiracy of rebels who were illegally obstructing the normal
operations of the national government.470 The Constitution called upon
Lincoln to use force, if necessary, against these rebels in order to see
"that the laws of the Union be faithfully executed in all the States."4 7'
Lincoln did not believe he had any choice; the Constitution required
him to put down the rebellion. "You have no oath registered in Hea-
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ven to destroy the government," Lincoln told the South, "while I shall
have the most solemn one to 'preserve, protect and defend' it."' '
Where Buchanan and previous presidents found only constitu-
tional weakness, Lincoln discovered constitutional strength. He pa-
tiently maneuvered circumstances so that Jefferson Davis's troops
would fire the first shot.73 Federal officials who sympathized with the
Confederacy handed over armories, treasuries, and property, but fed-
eral installations in several ports remained in Union hands. Fort Sum-
ter in Charleston Harbor held symbolic importance as a flashpoint. '74
On April 4, 1861, exactly one month into his term, Lincoln ordered the
navy to resupply the Union fort, and to use force only if fired upon.475
Davis ordered bombing to begin before the ships could arrive, and
Union forces surrendered on April 14. Lincoln did not consult Con-
gress, which was not in session, nor did he call Congress into session,
as he could "on extraordinary Occasions" under Article II, § 3 of the
Constitution. '7 He did not launch offensive operations against the
South, but he placed American forces in harm's way, which carried a
strong risk of starting a war between the states.
The North was woefully unprepared. Its small army was deployed
primarily along the western frontiers; its navy had only a few warships
ready for action in American waters. 4 After the fall of Fort Sumter,
Lincoln sprung to action. On April 15, he declared a state of rebel-
lion and called forth seventy-five thousand state troops under the Mi-
litia Act. '79 He proclaimed that groups in the South were obstructing
the execution of federal law beyond the ability of courts and federal
officials to overcome."O Lincoln's proclamation prompted Virginia and
the other upper Southern states to secede.4' The president issued a call
for volunteers, increased the size of the regular army, and ordered the
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navy to enlist more sailors and purchase additional warships. ' He re-
moved millions from the Treasury for military recruitment and pay.,8
Article I, § 8 of the Constitution expressly vests in Congress the power
to raise an army and navy and to fund them; the president has no
power to exercise either authority.s'
Lincoln put the army and navy to immediate use. He ordered a
blockade of Southern ports and dispatched troops against rebel-held
territory. ' Lincoln called Congress into special session, but, signifi-
cantly, not until July 4." While of obvious symbolic importance, the
July 4 date ensured that the executive branch, not Congress, would set
initial war policy. Lincoln had three months to establish a status quo
that would be difficult for Congress to change. This was remarkable
leadership for a president who had been the underdog to win his par-
ty's nomination, who had not won a majority of the popular vote,
whose cabinet was filled with men with far more distinguished records
of public service, and who did not have close relationships with the
congressional leaders of his party.
Rapid events forced Lincoln to exercise broad authorities on de-
fense as well as offense. Maryland was a slave-holding state, and the
state legislature and the mayor of Baltimore were pro-Confederacy. 
4 7
If it seceded the nation's capital would be utterly isolated."' Mobs in
Baltimore attacked the first military units from Massachusetts and
Pennsylvania to reinforce the capital, and rebel sympathizers cut the
telegraph and railroad lines to Washington.4" Lincoln interpreted his
constitutional powers to give him the initiative in responding to the
emergency. 9° On April 27, 1861, he unilaterally suspended the writ of
habeas corpus on the route from Philadelphia to Washington and re-
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placed civilian law enforcement with military detention without trial. '
Suspension prevented rebel spies and operatives detained by the mili-
tary from petitioning the civilian courts for release.' 9 The Constitution
surely describes this power in the passive tense: "The privilege of the
Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of
Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it."' 93 But it is lo-
cated in Article I, which enumerates Congress's powers and its limits.
Whether the federal government even had the power to abolish
slavery remained unresolved. As he had proclaimed in his first inau-
gural address, Lincoln believed that slavery's preservation was a mat-
ter of state law and that the federal government had no power to
touch it where it already existed.9 ' Emancipation might qualify as the
largest taking of private property in American history, for which the
government would owe just compensation under the Fifth Amend-
ment. Another question that remained unclear was whether the Unit-
ed States had the right as a belligerent, under the laws of war, to free
slaves. A nation at war generally had the right to seize enemy property
when necessary to achieve its military goals, but it also could not, as an
occupying power, simply take all property held by private citizens.'9
As the conflict deepened, Lincoln's view on whether to order
emancipation as a military measure underwent significant change. He
had overturned Generals John Fremont and Benjamin Butler because
their proclamations were essentially political-they sought to free all
slaves in their territories, even those unconnected to the fighting. '
When General Butler in Virginia declared that slaves who escaped to
Union lines were "contraband" property that could be kept by the
Union, Lincoln let the order stand.4'9 Congress urged a more radical
approach by enacting two Confiscation Acts: the first deprived rebels
of ownership of their slaves put to work in the war; the second freed
the slaves encountered by Union forces." Because both laws required
an individual hearing before a federal judge before a slave could be
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freed, neither had much practical effect.'9 Of greater impact was the
July 1862 Militia Act, which freed the slave of any rebel, if that slave
joined the US armed forces. ° On August 25, 1862, Secretary of War
Edwin Stanton authorized the raising of the first five thousand black
troops for the Union army' ' As the war grew increasingly difficult,
Lincoln became convinced that emancipation would be a valuable
weapon for the Union cause. It would undermine the Confederacy's
labor force and economy while providing a much-needed pool of re-
cruits for the Union armies.
As the cost of the war in blood and treasure became ever higher,
demands for an end to slavery grew louder in the North.% At the same
time, the border states rejected proposals for gradual emancipation
paid for by the federal government. . By late July 1862, Lincoln had a
draft proclamation of emancipation ready and had notified his cabi-
net, which advised him to wait for a Union victory." Antietam pro-
vided Lincoln the moment.50, While Union casualties were steep (six
thousand dead and seventeen thousand wounded-up to that point
the most American casualties ever suffered in a single day), the Army
of the Potomac had forced the Confederate army from the field. 5. On
September 22, 1862, five days after the battle, Lincoln issued the prelim-
inary Emancipation Proclamation as president and commander in
chief.! It declared that all slaves in area under rebellion as of January 1,
1863, "shall be then, thenceforward, and forever free; and the executive
government of the United States, including the military and naval au-
thority thereof, will recognize and maintain the freedom of such per-
sons.""' Lincoln stated his intention to ask Congress for compensation
for the loyal slave states that voluntarily adopted emancipation, and
for Southerners who lost slaves but remained loyal to the Union."' The
president remained clear that the war was not about slavery, but the
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restoration of the Union.'10 Nevertheless, his proclamation freed 2.9
million slaves, 74 percent of all slaves in the United States and over 82
percent of the slaves in the Confederacy."1 On January 1, 1863, Lincoln
issued the final Emancipation Proclamation, "by virtue of the power
in me vested as Commander-in-Chief, of the Army and Navy of the
United States in time of actual armed rebellion against authority and
government of the United States....2 The president rooted the constitu-
tional justification for the Emancipation Proclamation as "a fit and
necessary war measure for suppressing said rebellion....3
Lincoln's dependence on his constitutional authority explains the
Emancipation Proclamation's careful boundaries. He did not free any
slaves in the loyal states, nor did he seek to remake the economic and
political order of Southern society. Lincoln never claimed a broad
right to end slavery. Rather, the Emancipation Proclamation was an
exercise of the president's war power to undertake measures neces-
sary to defeat the enemy. With the cost of war in both men and money
rising steeply, emancipation became a means to the end of restoring
the Union. Shortly before issuing the preliminary Proclamation, Lin-
coln wrote to Republican newspaper editor Horace Greeley, and
through him to a broad readership, that his goal was to restore "the Un-
ion as it was.""4 Emancipation was justified only so far as it helped
achieve victory. "My paramount object in this struggle is to save the
Union, and is not either to save or to destroy slavery," Lincoln wrote."'
"If I could save the Union without freeing any slave I would do it, and if
I could save it by freeing all the slaves I would do it; and if I could save
it by freeing some and leaving others alone I would also do that.'
Lincoln made clear that the Commander-in-Chief Clause allows
measures based on military necessity that would not be legal in peace-
time. Responding to critics from his home state, he admitted that "I
certainly wish that all men could be free, while I suppose you do
not..'... Still, emancipation was a valid war measure. "I think the consti-
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tution invests its commander-in-chief, with the law of war, in time of
war," he wrote."' Anything that belligerents could lawfully do in war-
time, therefore, fell within the president's authority. There was no
question in Lincoln's mind that taking the enemy's property was a
legitimate policy in war. "Armies, the world over, destroy enemies'
property when they can not use it; and even destroy their own to keep
it from the enemy.'' 9 "Civilized belligerents do all in their power to
help themselves, or hurt the enemy, except a few things regarded as
barbarous or cruel," such as the massacre of prisoners or noncomba-
tants."' Lincoln would consider anything permitted by the laws of war.
Emancipation did not just deny the South a vital resource, but it
also provided black soldiers for the war effort. Lincoln claimed that
Union generals "believe the emancipation policy, and the use of co-
lored troops, constitute the heaviest blow yet dealt to the rebellion.. 2.
Black soldiers saved the lives and energies of white soldiers, and, in-
deed, the lives and rights of white civilians. "You say you will not fight
to free negroes," Lincoln wrote.22 "Some of them seem willing to fight
for you."'2' But he closed by emphasizing again that emancipation was
not the goal, but the means. When the war ended, "[i]t will then have
been proved that, among free men, there can be no successful appeal
from the ballot to the bullet; and that they who take such appeal are
sure to lose their case, and pay the cost.'.2 When that day comes, Lin-
coln promised, "there will be some black men who can remember that,
with silent tongue, and clenched teeth, and steady eye, and well-poised
bayonet," they helped achieve victory."5
The Emancipation Proclamation is usually studied as a question
of the war powers of the national government, though it has also been
studied as a question of whether it amounted to a taking of property
requiring compensation. 2 What is sometimes neglected is that the
Proclamation was a startling demonstration of the constitutional pow-
ers of the Presidency. Lincoln decided that military necessity justified
emancipation. He did not consult with Congress, which had a very
different program in mind. The Supreme Court did not reach the
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question of the wartime confiscation of property until after the end of
the war, when it upheld the seizure, transfer, and destruction of private
property that supported the enemy's ability to carry on hostilities.",
Lincoln freed the slaves en masse and bypassed the painstaking judi-
cial procedures established by Congress. The legislature authorized
the acceptance of escaped slaves into the Union armed forces, but it
remained for the president to organize and deploy in combat the more
than 130,000 freedmen who joined the Union armies.'
While the Proclamation had a broad scope, it also recognized the
limits of presidential power. It only touched those areas, the Southern
states, where slaves helped the enemy.'29 It did not reach into the insti-
tution of slavery in the loyal states.53 Emancipation would no longer
be a justifiable war measure once the fighting ceased, and it could
even be frustrated by the other branches while war continued. Con-
gress might use its own constitutional powers to establish a different
regime -a reasonable concern with Democratic successes in the 1862
midterm elections-and allow the states to restore slavery once the
war ended."' Lincoln understood that to ensure slavery's permanent
532
end, the states would have to adopt a constitutional amendment.
Toward the end of the war, he pressed for adoption of a complete
prohibition of slavery in what eventually became the Thirteenth
Amendment."' Ratification made the link between emancipation and
democratic rule clear. In June 1864, Congress rejected the amendment,
which would be the first since the changes to the Electoral College
after the Jefferson-Burr deadlock in 1801." After resounding Repub-
lican victories in the November elections, Lincoln called upon the
same lame-duck Congress to ratify the Thirteenth AmendmentY.3  "It is
the voice of the people now, for the first time, heard upon the ques-
tion." 5 ' In a time of "great national crisis," Lincoln said "unanimity of
action" was needed, and that required "some deference ... to the will
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of the majority, simply because it is the will of the majority.'537 Con-
gress promptly agreed to ratify the amendment even before the new
Republican majorities took over.538
Lincoln's great political achievement was to meld the original
purpose of the war with the new goal of ending slavery. Emancipation
of the slaves and restoration of the Union both drew upon Lincoln's
belief, expressed in his First Inaugural Address, that the Constitution
enshrined a democratk process in which the fundamental decisions
were up to the people, as expressed in the ballot box."' He tied to-
gether the concepts of popular sovereignty and liberty in the Gettys-
burg Address, reconciling the political structure of the Constitution
with the values of the Declaration of Independence.- ° Lincoln justified
the carnage of the battle with the prospect of preserving the "new na-
tion," created by "our fathers" that was "conceived in Liberty, and
dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal."' " The
equality of all men, of course, was not an explicit goal of the Union as
established in the Constitution, but instead was recognized by the
Declaration of Independence. ' Lincoln called on "us the living" to
dedicate themselves "to the great task remaining before us" to ensure
"that this nation, under God, shall have a new birth of freedom" and
"that government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall
not perish from the earth..... Restoring the Union now stood for two
propositions: the working of popular democracy and freedom and
equality for all men. Emancipation may have been a policy justified by
military necessity, but it became an end of the war as well as a means.
Lincoln's words at Gettysburg illustrated, as perhaps nothing else
could, the president's control over national strategy in wartime. When
the war began, Lincoln established the limited goal of restoring the
Union, and Congress agreed in the Crittenden-Johnson resolutions,
which declared that the goal of the war was preservation of the Union,
while leaving alone the "established institutions" of slavery in the ex-
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isting states.!" Initial military strategy focused on blockading the Con-
federacy in the East while dividing it in the West through capture of
the Mississippi. This "Anaconda" strategy would slowly strangle the
South until it came back to its senses and returned to the Union. 5 By
the middle of 1862, stiff Southern resistance had convinced Lincoln
that only unconditional surrender could end the war. " National goals
became both restoration of the Union and, after the Emancipation
Proclamation, freedom for all. Strategy shifted to the destruction of
Confederate armies in the field and the end of the government in
Richmond. Lincoln's declaration that the war sought a new birth of
freedom, he believed, would encourage "the army to strike more vi-
gorous blows" by setting an example of the administration "strik[ing]
at the heart of the rebellion.' 4 7
Lincoln's unprecedented action to preserve the Union exploited
the broadest reaches of the Constitution's grant of the Chief Execu-
tive and commander-in-chief powers. Once war had begun, Lincoln
took control of all measures necessary to subdue the enemy, including
the definition of war aims and strategy, supervision of military opera-
tions, detention of enemy prisoners, and management of the occupa-
tion. He freed the slaves, but only those in the South, because his
powers were limited to the battlefield. He took swift action, normally
within Congress's domain, but only because of the pressure of emer-
gency. After the first months of the war, Lincoln never again usurped
Congress's powers over the raising or funding of the military. He was
not afraid of a contest with Congress, particularly over Reconstruction,
but the Civil War witnessed far more cooperation between the execu-
tive and legislative branches than is commonly thought. When Lincoln
believed Congress to be wrong, he did not hesitate to draw upon the
constitutional powers of his own office to follow his best judgment. Lin-
coln's greatness in preserving the Union depended crucially on his dis-
covery of the broad executive powers inherent in Article II.
CONCLUSION
Calabresi and Yoo have brought a much-needed historical pers-
pective to the question of the president's removal and law enforce-
ment powers. Their contribution is not that they have turned to history
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when no one else has. Rather, it is that they have brought to light a cer-
tain kind of history: the evolution of an institution from the Framing to
the current day. Their approach should appeal to scholars unconvinced
that evidence from the original understanding is determinate or deter-
minative. It may particularly prove useful to those who believe a com-
mon law approach-following tradition and the development of
precedent-is the best method for interpreting the Constitution.
Still, The Unitary Executive incompletely lives up to its promise. It
makes a good case for "unitary," but not for "executive." Though there
are questions about whether practice is as uniform as Calabresi and
Yoo believe, their work establishes a strong record in favor of the
president's authority to remove all subordinate officers in the execu-
tive branch. Where their work falls short, however, is explaining why
the unitary executive is, in fact, an executive. If we follow the same
methodology as Calabresi and Yoo, it becomes apparent that the ex-
ecutive power encompasses much more than managing those who
enforce the law. Article II vests powers of substance that come to the
fore during crises. Some of our greatest presidents have accessed those
grants to the great benefit of the nation, such as Washington in declar-
ing neutrality, Jefferson in buying Louisiana, and Lincoln in winning
the Civil War. Presidents can also err when they misread conditions or
turn their powers to purposes not envisioned by the Constitution. As
that same nation struggles yet again with economic downturn and war,
the need for presidential leadership will rise again.
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